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EPI UPDATE
A weekly publication by the Bureau of Epidemiology
"The reason for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information
on a disease is to control that disease. Collection and analysis should not be allowed to
consume resources if action does not follow."
--Foege WH et al. Int. J of Epidemiology 1976; 5:29-37.
For July 1, 1999
Richard S. Hopkins, MD, MSPH, Bureau Chief, State Epidemiologist
Don Ward, Surveillance Section Administrator, Epi Update Managing Editor
Natalie E. Tackett, Epi Update Editor
Bureau of Epidemiology Frequent Contributors:
Steven Wiersma, MD, MPH,
Deputy State Epidemiologist |
William J. Bigler, PhD, MS,
Senior Epidemiologist |
Jodi Baldy, MPH,
Biological Scientist IV |
Ursula
E. Bauer, PhD,
Chronic Disease Epidemiologist |
John
Werth, MA,
Bureau Education Coordinator |
Lisa
Conti, DVM, MPH,
State Public Health Veterinarian |
|
Regional
Epidemiologists: |
Dolly
Katz, PhD, MPH,
SE Florida |
Roger Sanderson, RN, MA,
SW Florida |
Carina
Blackmore, MS Vet. Med., PhD, NE Florida |
Zuber Mulla, MSPH,
Central Florida |
Gérard
Krause, MD, DTMH,
NW Florida |
Please print out this material and share with epidemiology staff, county
health department directors, administrators, medical directors, nursing directors,
environmental health directors and others with an interest in information of this type.
Thank you.
The Bureau of Epidemiology is available 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week for consultation at our main number (850/245-4401) PLEASE NOTE:
Consultation after 5 p.m. & on weekends is intended for emergencies.
The Department of Health has a home on the World Wide Web at ---
http://www.doh.state.fl.us
In this issue:
1. Reporting Clarifications and Then Some...
2. Contamination of Belgian Food and Livestock Feed Link
3. Rabies Alert Map
4. Salmonellosis from Unpasteurized Orange Juice
5. Florida Past: The Dirty Soda Glass
6. Weekly Disease Table: Week 25
1. Reporting Clarifications and Then Some...
Jodi Baldy, MPH and Don Ward
After publishing the new case definitions and related materials in the last Epi
Update, we received several questions and requests for clarification. The following
should resolve some of the inconsistencies, errors and lack of clarity:
Case Definitions.
- Attached is a replacement (pestrev99.doc) for pages 28 and 29, the
Pesticide-Related Illness definition. Changes made were in the matrix, "probable
case" category, 2nd column exposure should be 2, health effects, 1
and causal relationship, 1. The "Comment" section was amended, deleting
references to the national centers and telephone numbers.
- Attached is a replacement for page 39 (replc39.doc). The ICD Code for Trichinosis
is 12400, not 13090 as originally printed in the document.
Listeria. Cases of listeriosis are to be reported on the National Bacterial
Meningitis and Bacteremia Case Report form (CDC 52.15). Listeria meningitis
will continue to be reported as ICD Code 32070 and other forms of listeriosis will be
reported as ICD Code 02700.
Disease List. Attached (List99.doc and List2-99.doc) are two lists of
the notifiable diseases that may be reproduced and sent to providers. Please note that
certain diseases are annotated with a (T) to indicate the need for telephone
reporting. The "new Ts" are: hepatitis A; listeriosis; meningococcal meningitis;
smallpox, tularemia, and "outbreaks."
Lab Findings List. Recent rule revisions included considerable changes for
laboratory reporting responsibilities. The DOH has the responsibility of furnishing a list
of "reportable laboratory findings" to be used by laboratories in determining
which results are diagnostic for the notifiable diseases and conditions. This list (rptblablist.doc
) is as comprehensive as possible, but may not include all tests indicative of
notifiables; it will be updated periodically, as changes in technology and reporting
criteria warrant.
Congenital Anomalies (Birth Defects). Congenital anomalies diagnosed by one year of
age during an inpatient hospitalization may be reported by hospitals to the Agency for
Health Care Administration (ACHA) as part of the hospital discharge data submission. No
additional reporting is required. Diagnoses during an inpatient hospitalization that are
not reported to ACHA must be reported by the hospital directly to the Birth Defects
Registry. This may include stillbirths that occur to inpatients, and any other eligible
diagnosis that is not reported to ACHA, who only accepts the top ten diagnoses for any
patient.
In addition, physicians are responsible for reporting eligible cases when the diagnosis
is made in an outpatient or ambulatory setting. These reports go directly to the Birth
Defects Registry using the same form as hospitals. If the patient was ever hospitalized
for the condition or the condition was reported at birth, then the physician does not have
to make a new report. However, reporting is mandatory for a new diagnosis, a condition not
diagnosed at birth, or a stillbirth in an outpatient or ambulatory setting. The reporting
requirement applies to births and fetal deaths in Florida (starting July 4, 1999).
Detailed instructions and forms will be mailed to hospitals, selected physicians, and
county health departments in July through the Births Defects Surveillance section. For
questions concerning the Birth Defects Registry or reporting of congenital anomalies,
contact Russ Mardon, PhD, Bureau of Environmental Epidemiology at (850) 488-3370.
Rule Revisions. Attached are the rule revisions (rul98finadop.doc) as
submitted for final adoption. The Bureau of Administrative Codes revisions will not
be available for some time so this document will give you access to the important changes.
Pesticide-Related Illness or
Injury
Reportable Laboratory Findings
Pesticide-related Illness or
Injury
Toxoplasmosis
Chapter 64D-3, Florida
Administrative Code
List of Reportable Diseases/Conditions in
Florida
The Current List of Reportable
Diseases/Conditions in Florida
2. Contamination of Belgian Food and Livestock Feed Link
Submitted by Steven Wiersma, MD, MPH from a ProMED publication
In Belgium, the contamination of animal feed with PCBs has caused a major public health
incident that has lead to the ban of Belgian food imports in several countries. The
following represents an informative summary of the situation occurring there.
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 1999 11:23:31 +0200
"One month after a crisis broke out over dioxin contamination in Belgian food and
livestock feed, it is still not known exactly what toxins were present, how much was
there, how much food was contaminated, and where it went. A government has fallen over the
issue, but little science is being done, and government regulators in countries that have
banned Belgian food imports are wondering if and when they can lift the bans. This is an
update on the event. I am writing in a personal capacity. My views do not necessarily
express those of the publications for which I work.
"To recap what we know: about 8 litres of used PCB, probably from a transformer,
ended up in an 80 tonne batch of recycled fats subsequently used to make animal feed,
mainly for chickens, in mid-January 1999. It was sold as recycled animal fat, but
contained vegetable oil too. There has been talk of motor oil but that is probably a
confusion.
"One theory of how this happened involves public recycling depots for used frying
fat, which also have containers for used motor oil. PCBs shouldn't have been in either.
But it is possible that someone heading for the motor oil bin trying to quietly dispose of
transformer oil instead dumped it in the used food oil. Other theories are that the PCBs
were dumped deliberately or accidentally by a waste dealer; or that a heat transfer pipe
using PCBs as the circulating fluid leaked, as in the Yusho incident in Japan [1968] and
the Yu Cheng incident in Taiwan.
"Belgium is currently investigating several recycling companies other than their
initial suspects. In February 1999 chicken farmers noticed that some laying hens were sick
and dead, some chicks were failing to hatch, and some that did hatch had
"neurological symptoms", probably impaired movement. One of the PCDFs in the mix
was one for which the toxicity in birds is very high, as per the re-evaluation of relative
congener toxicity done in 1998 by Martin Van den Berg et al, Env Health Perspectives, v106
pp 775-790, Dec 1998.
"It is possible that we would never have found out about this incident were that
not the case. If the fat had been fed to cows, there would probably have been no symptoms,
and in any EU country but Germany, which actively monitors milk for dioxins, the event
might not have been detected for months. The Belgian farmers went to their feed companies,
the feed companies called their insurance people, they called in a veterinary inspector,
and he looked for everything, mainly nutrient deficiencies. Then in April 1999 he wondered
if it might be dioxins -- a lucky stroke of insight as dioxins are usually suspected only
in grazing animals exposed to incinerator deposits. He sent a sample of feed, and a dead
laying hen, to RIKILT-DLO, the Dutch national lab for food quality in Wageningen, the
Netherlands, choosing them partly because VITO in Mol, the only lab in Belgium accredited
for dioxin analysis, specialises in milk.
"Toxicity for mixtures of dioxins and dioxin-like compounds, is expressed as toxic
equivalency, or TEQ, a figure arrived at by multiplying the concentration of each congener
present by its
known relative toxicity. RIKILT found 958 TEQ pg/g fat PCDDs and PCDFs (mostly the
latter) in the chicken, and 781 ng TEQ per g of feed. The pattern of congeners resembled
the Yusho incident in 1968 in Japan, especially the PCDFs, so RIKILT concluded that the
origin was PCB contamination, and calculated the ratio of PCB to fat on this basis. PCBs
have now been confirmed by direct measurement. These are the only numbers available for
feed contamination, apart from the PCBs noted below. The feed companies told the
government in late April 1999. It asked for another analysis. RIKILT tested 2 eggs,
intended for hatching, and a laying hen. The eggs tested at 713 and 266 pg/g fat TEQ, the
chicken 741 pg/g fat TEQ. Another 10 chicks were also tested and were contaminated --
levels have not been released.
They were probably collected in April 1999, but the scientists who tested them aren't
sure.
"On 26 May 1999 Belgium informed its neighbours and the European Commission as
required by law. The Commission is launching court action over the delay. Belgium pulled
chickens and eggs off the market, then products made with eggs. Then they found cows and
pigs had got the feed so they pulled beef and pork, and stopped exporting milk on order of
the Commission though it was still sold in Belgium. They took Belgian butter off the
market, though some report finding it in supermarkets. Indeed much depended on the
cooperation of retailers -- I saw egg waffles on snack shelves in small shops which
certainly were not removed during the crisis. Bins were set up for people to dump banned
food, but many people did not use them, and at least some of what was dumped was spirited
away.
"The government tried to determine what feed companies bought the fat, what farms
bought their feed, and what farms didn't and could therefore be exonerated so as to get
food back on the market. This was in the middle of a federal election campaign. The
government defeat on 13 June 1999 was widely attributed to anger over the delay in
informing the public about the dioxin contamination.
"The numbers cited above are the only measurements of dioxins in chickens from the
period of probable maximum contamination of which I or anyone I have talked to is aware.
Analyses now being done intensively at laboratories throughout Belgium and the region are
aimed at making sure food available now is clean. RIKILT has found no evidence of
contamination in any recent Dutch or Belgian food. No other data has been released.
"As PCBs cost less to analyse than dioxins, and this can be done by many
laboratories in Belgium, the Belgian government has commissioned extensive PCB analyses on
recent food. It is not being analysed quantitatively for total PCBs, but for a standard
set of seven congeners being used as a marker for this incident. We don't know how much
toxicity in food contaminated by the incident can be attributed to PCBs as no one has yet
done a full congener analysis -- and the 7 standard congeners are not the
co-planardioxin-like types for which we have toxic equivalency factors from which TEQ is
calculated.
"Without sampling and testing of food from February and March 1999, we will never
know how contaminated the food was, how much and what kinds of food were contaminated, or
where it was distributed. Apparently one Belgian institute has plans to try and collect
such samples, but it is only starting now. The only other measurement of contamination I
have been able to acquire is from a private Belgian laboratory, which found 332 - 519
micrograms PCBs (7 congeners) per gram fat in feed. The ratio between this and known
dioxin values gram for gram in the RIKILT measurements is about right, I am told. It is
not clear from the records that have been obtained when this feed was sampled. The
European Commission's scientific committee on food in an opinion dated 16 June 1999 said
dioxin-like PCBs accounted for 80 per cent of the TEQ in food contaminated by the Belgian
incident. This means that the 900 pg/g TEQs for dioxins that may have existed in eggs
during the period of probable peak contamination is only a fifth of the total toxicity.
But the committee based that rough estimate on known ratios of the seven congeners
analysed to other congeners in Aroclors 1245 and 1260, thought to resemble the original
contaminant mixture, making this a very rough estimate. Their report l is largely concerned with whether to let Belgian milk back onto the EU
market.
"The 80 tonnes of fat thought to be behind all this was enough to make 1600
tonnes, or 10 million chicken-days, of feed. It is not clear whether the authorities have
been attempting to account for all 80 tonnes of the fat in the records of the feed
companies, or all 1600 tonnes of feed that could have been made from it. Sales records are
not enough to trace the contamination, because of a widespread practice of making sales
without paperwork.
"Is this incident over? Everyone I have talked to says this was a one-off, that
one 80 tonne contaminated batch of fats was the problem, and it has probably been eaten.
Probably the contamination has already gone through the food chain insofar as it affected
chickens, which have a fast turnover rate.
"But some of the contamination fed to cows and hogs may still be there and may not
have gone through humans yet. No data have been released as to whether there have been any
elevated levels of PCBs or dioxins found in meat, apart from general statements that meat
produced recently is clean. There have been no elevated levels in recent milk, beyond
Europe's usual background, which could be due to batch dilution.
"Meanwhile Austria, moved to do some analyses by this incident, found dioxin
in some domestically produced pig feed. Levels were much lower than in Belgium,
and the feed has been impounded.
Dioxins are given as 2 - 6 pg TEQ per g of feed, much less than the few values reported
for Belgium. I do not know if the Austrians have done any pork analyses.
"The Europeans' dioxin plight is not unique. An article to appear in the
journal Environmental Research in October will report among the first published
measurements of the levels of dioxins in chickens during a dioxin-in-feed
incident in the southern US 2 years ago. Levels were a tenth those in Belgium,
but the contamination appears to have lasted for years, and was only picked up
because of a one-off survey of dioxins in food undertaken by EPA and USDA. Some
details may be found in New Scientist, 26 June 1999.
"There are plans for health surveys in Belgium to follow up this incident, but
these will be of little use without data on the extent and nature of the contamination. A
breast milk survey might be informative, but there would be 'noise' problems -- levels in
western Europe are already high -- and unless the high levels of some PCDFs can be taken
as a signature, it would be impossible to say whether any observed increases in dioxins or
PCBs were caused by this incident. This is especially true as this is not the first time
Europe has been affected by dioxins in feed. Dioxin-laced citrus pulp was discovered in
1997 to be affecting milk cattle. As in the US episode concentrations were lower than the
few we know about from Belgium, but affected a larger area for a longer time. Some details
of this are in the New Scientist article cited above. "
Debora MacKenzie, Europe correspondent
3. Rabies Alert Map
Lisa Conti, DMV, MPH
Florida counties currently address the problem of epizootic raccoon rabies through
prevention measures including public education, enforcement of pet vaccination ordinances
and animal control. In general, any unusual increase in the number of rabid animals
elicits the declaration of a rabies alert by the county health director. Rabies
alerts serve to inform the community to reduce their risk of exposure to potentially rabid
animals. Alerts should be evaluated and removed after rabies activity has
decreased. A sixty-day period is a general guideline for this in practice. An updated
"Rabies Alert Map" will be maintained on the Department of Health website at http://www.doh.state.fl.us (click on
"Epidemiology" and "Vector-Borne
Diseases").

4. Salmonellosis from Unpasteurized Orange
Juice
Submitted by Richard Hopkins, MD, MSPH
Date: June 25, 1999
From: Foodborne and Diarrheal Diseases Branch
Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, NCID
Subject: Salmonella Muenchen infections associated with consumption of orange juice
To: State and Territorial Epidemiologists
State and Territorial Public Health Laboratory Directors
"This message is being sent by e-mail and FAX to inform you about a recent cluster
of cases of Salmonella Muenchen infections in Washington State and Oregon linked to the
consumption of drinks containing "fresh-squeezed," unpasteurized orange juice
traced to a single distributor, which distributes orange juice widely in the United
States.
"On June 19, 1999, the Washington Department of Health received notice of three
cases of Salmonella group C-2 infection. An ongoing investigation has determined that nine
unrelated persons in the Seattle area became ill with Salmonella group C-2 infection in
June; three isolates have been serotyped as Muenchen. The ill persons range in age from 2
to 85 years. Complete food histories were obtained from seven persons; all consumed a
fruit smoothie drink from an outlet of Chain A between June 12 and June 16. Ill persons
patronized four different Chain A outlets, which has around 10-12 outlets in Washington
and several in the San Francisco Bay area. All but one of the smoothies contained
"fresh squeezed," unpasteurized orange juice, which is usually delivered twice a
week from Company B in Arizona; the other smoothie was mixed in the same machine used to
make the orange-juice-containing smoothies. Company B is thought to distribute orange
juice to many states mostly in the western United States. A label from one of the orange
juice containers lists Arizona, California, Florida and Mexico as the source of the
oranges.
"On June 23, the Oregon Health Division identified a cluster of diarrheal illness
among persons who consumed a restaurant buffet-style meal on June13. A stool culture from
one person yielded S. Muenchen. Ten of the 13 participants were interviewed; all four ill
persons, but none of the six well persons, consumed orange juice (p=0.005). The orange
juice came from Company B. Orange juice from Company B is available in at least one retail
store in the Portland, Oregon, area.
"S. Muenchen is an uncommonly isolated serotype; Washington typically isolates 10
or fewer per year and Oregon 6 or fewer per year. State health departments who identify
persons with S. Muenchen or serogroup C-2 infections beginning June 1, 1999 might wish to
interview patients about consumption of orange juice. Attached is a standard questionnaire
to assure that information from many sites is collected in a similar manner. Please
continue to update your PHLIS Salmonella reporting weekly so that the extent of the
increase in S. Muenchen can be monitored in your state and at the national level. Although
any S. Muenchen isolated in June, especially from a person in a western state, should be
considered suspect as being part of this outbreak, states might wish to refer some suspect
isolates for PFGE with the standardized PulseNet protocol by an area laboratory or to
CDC."
5. Florida Past: The Dirty Soda Glass
William J Bigler, PhD
In the 1920s, the State Board of Health was linked with only a handful of local
health departments and used the "Florida Health Notes" to publicize a variety of
emerging personal and environmental health issues. The authors of articles sometimes went
to great lengths to stimulate interest in and elicit support for new public health disease
prevention policies. George W. Simons, Jr., S.B., Chief of the Bureau of Engineering, was
a master at getting his point across, even if it meant taking the readership on an
occasional guilt trip. The following excerpts are from a piece entitled "The Dirty
Soda Glass" which appeared in the July, August and September issue (Vol. 14, No.5)
1922.
"How many readers of HEALTH NOTES have ever taken the time while at a soda
fountain or drink stand to watch how thoroughly the glasses and other ware are cleaned?
Have you ever wondered about the chance element of danger lurking in the poorly cleansed
soda glass has it ever occurred to you that you might be taking a chance when you
drink from a glass cleaned only by a hurried, careless dipping in none too clean water.
"It is universal custom in every household to thoroughly wash and dry dishes and
ware after meals; only cleaned dry dishes are tolerated on the table. This washing process
most always consists of a SOAP AND HOT WATER washing, a scalding and finally a cloth
drying. Some homes may not follow this schedule exactly, but generally speaking it
represents pretty much the average practice. HOW MANY PEOPLE ACCUSTOMED TO THIS USUAL HOME
PROCEDURE WOULD TOLERATE A CHANGE TO THE SLOVENLY, FILTHY METHODS USED AT NINE TENTHS OF
THE DRINK STANDS AND FOUNTAINS THE MERE DIPPING OR RINSING OF THE GLASS OR DISH IN
COLD - NONE TOO CLEAN WATER?
"Some of the fountain owners are changing their ways willingly, others
reluctantly, and are using paper ware which is thrown away after each use; others are
washing their glass and silver ware after each use in soapy hot water and drying it
just as in the home BUT HOW MANY? After you read this article make an inspection at
your favorite drink parlor and note the practice THEN RESTRICT YOUR TRADE TO THE FELLOW
WHO IS TREATING YOU RIGHT.
"Some towns have governing bodies who sanction these dirty methods. Recently in a
south Florida city a CITY COMMISSIONER REQUESTED THE JUDGE TO DISMISS A CASE AGAINST A
DRUG STORE FOUNTAIN MAN BECAUSE OF UNSANITARY CONDITIONS. THERE IS A REASON and we wonder
how many people of this particular city investigated to find out the reason? This
commissioner swore to uphold the laws, yet would tolerate such a filthy place.
"During the early part of July there was a very important meeting held in Orlando:
the first of its kind in the State a meeting of municipal and state health workers,
sanitary and food inspectors
The question of cleaning soda fountain ware was
thoroughly discussed and at the conclusion the following resolution was adopted a
procedure which the State Board of Health heartily endorses and recommends to every
Florida town for practice
'Realizing the importance of adequate and protective cleaning of glassware used by the
public at soda fountains, cold drink stands, ice cream parlors, and other places;
We recommend that glassware of the type alluded to in the foregoing paragraph shall be
first washed in hot soapsuds for the temperature of not less than 150 degrees F., and then
rinsed in clean hot water and dried and polished with a clean cloth, before any such
glassware shall be used in the dispensing or serving of liquid refreshments.
'Any exception or exceptions to the foregoing procedure are permissible only on written
approval by the local health physician, subject to the approval of the State Board of
Health.
'We further recommend that dishes and other utensils used in eating, each time before
being used in the serving of foods and refreshments, shall be washed and boiled in
soapsuds, rinsed, dried and polished with clean cloth.
'The above recommendations were presented by the Sanitarians of the State of Florida,
as represented by State Board of Health, State Hotel Commission and municipal health
officers.'
"Mr. and Mrs. Average Citizen should take more interest in these matters of public
concern. Dirty wet glasses and dishes are POTENTIAL DISEASE CARRIERS. Mr. and Mrs. Citizen
can do a world of good in bringing about a change for the better by restricting his or her
trade to those firms willing to do their bit. PUBLIC PRESSURE THAT DENTS THE POCKET BOOK
IS MORE POTENT THAN ALL OUR LAWS."
6. Weekly Disease Table - Week 25
County-Confirmed Cases, Sorted Alphabetically by Disease
NR represents years that the disease lacked status as a reportable condition
DISEASE |
1996 TO DATE |
1997 TO DATE |
1998 TO DATE |
3 YEAR AVERAGE
TO DATE |
1998 TOTAL CASES |
1999 TO DATE |
| Amebiasis |
33 |
23 |
28 |
28 |
91 |
19 |
| Anthrax |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Botulism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Brucellosis |
5 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
| Campylobacteriosis |
469 |
408 |
305 |
394 |
975 |
376 |
| Ciguatera |
7 |
2 |
6 |
5 |
7 |
1 |
| Cryptosporidiosis |
58 |
38 |
48 |
48 |
203 |
49 |
| Cyclosporiasis |
69 |
47 |
4 |
40 |
6 |
2 |
| Dengue |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0.3 |
5 |
3 |
| Diphtheria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| E. coli O157:H7 |
9 |
22 |
9 |
13.3 |
56 |
14 |
| E. coli, other (known serotype) |
2 |
3 |
2 |
2.3 |
12 |
11 |
| Ehrlichiosis, Human |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0.7 |
1 |
0 |
| Encephalitis, Eastern Equine |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Encephalitis, St. Louis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
| Encephalitis, other (known organism) |
3 |
6 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
2 |
| Encephalitis, post-infectious* |
8 |
5 |
4 |
5.7 |
21 |
3 |
| Giardiasis (acute) |
676 |
611 |
517 |
601.3 |
1636 |
402 |
| Haemophilus influenzae*, invasive |
8 |
8 |
20 |
12 |
45 |
27 |
| Hansens Disease (Leprosy) |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
4 |
2 |
| Hantavirus Infection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome |
0 |
2 |
2 |
1.3 |
12 |
2 |
| Hemorrhagic Fever |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Hepatitis A |
207 |
187 |
247 |
213.7 |
539 |
291 |
| Hepatitis B |
229 |
170 |
170 |
189.7 |
465 |
178 |
| Hepatitis Non-A, Non-B |
29 |
41 |
40 |
36.7 |
95 |
2 |
| Hepatitis, unspecified |
2 |
3 |
4 |
3 |
26 |
7 |
| Histoplasmosis |
3 |
2 |
8 |
4.3 |
17 |
0 |
| Kawasaki |
11 |
13 |
31 |
18.3 |
54 |
0 |
| Lead Poisoning |
891 |
589 |
736 |
738.7 |
1806 |
272 |
| Legionellosis |
12 |
13 |
19 |
14.7 |
48 |
11 |
| Leptospirosis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
| Lyme Disease |
5 |
8 |
14 |
9 |
70 |
15 |
| Malaria |
36 |
30 |
23 |
29.7 |
96 |
38 |
| Measles |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1.3 |
2 |
1 |
| Meningococcal Disease (N. meningitidis) |
110 |
82 |
65 |
85.7 |
133 |
57 |
| Meningitis, Group B Streptococci |
11 |
6 |
8 |
8.3 |
22 |
6 |
| Meningitis, Haemophilus influenzae |
3 |
4 |
7 |
4.7 |
12 |
11 |
| Meningitis, Streptococcus pneumoniae |
55 |
44 |
51 |
50 |
96 |
60 |
| Meningitis, Listeria monocytogenes |
4 |
2 |
4 |
3.3 |
13 |
3 |
| Meningitis, other bacterial (including unspecified) |
52 |
26 |
26 |
34.7 |
75 |
29 |
| Mercury Poisoning |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1.7 |
4 |
2 |
| Mumps |
4 |
8 |
9 |
7 |
11 |
2 |
| Paralytic Shellfish Poisoning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Pertussis |
37 |
33 |
18 |
29.3 |
39 |
22 |
| Pesticide Poisoning |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0.3 |
1 |
3 |
| Plague |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Poliomyelitis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Psittacosis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0.3 |
2 |
0 |
| Rabies, Animal |
102 |
149 |
96 |
115.7 |
215 |
82 |
| Reye Syndrome |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0.3 |
1 |
0 |
| Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
| Rubella, including congenital |
10 |
0 |
3 |
4.3 |
4 |
0 |
| Salmonellosis |
786 |
728 |
716 |
743.3 |
3038 |
796 |
| Shigellosis |
593 |
507 |
788 |
629.3 |
2343 |
621 |
| Streptococcal Disease, invasive Group A |
0 |
21 |
25 |
15.3 |
59 |
36 |
| Streptococcus pneumoniae, Drug Resistant |
0 |
111 |
257 |
122.7 |
491 |
312 |
| Tetanus |
1 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
| Toxic Shock Syndrome |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1.3 |
4 |
2 |
| Toxoplasmosis |
5 |
3 |
6 |
4.7 |
15 |
4 |
| Typhoid Fever |
11 |
4 |
8 |
7.7 |
16 |
20 |
| Typhus (Louse & Murine) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Vibrio cholerae (serogrp O1) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Vibrio cholerae (serogrp Non-O1) |
1 |
5 |
4 |
3.3 |
11 |
3 |
| Vibrio vulnificus |
3 |
5 |
6 |
4.7 |
35 |
3 |
| Vibrio other (including unspecified) |
9 |
15 |
21 |
15 |
73 |
16 |
| Yellow Fever |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|