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EPI UPDATE
A weekly publication by the Bureau of Epidemiology
For September 17, 1999
"The reason for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information
on a disease is to control that disease. Collection and analysis should not be allowed to
consume resources if action does not follow."
--Foege WH et al. Int. J of Epidemiology 1976; 5:29-37.
Richard S. Hopkins, MD, MSPH, Bureau Chief, State Epidemiologist
Don Ward, Surveillance Section Administrator, Epi Update Managing Editor
Jill H. Parker, MSP, Epi Update Editor
Bureau of Epidemiology Frequent Contributors:
Steven
Wiersma, MD, MPH,
Deputy State Epidemiologist |
William
J. Bigler, PhD, MS,
Senior Epidemiologist |
Jodi
Baldy, MPH,
Biological Scientist IV |
Ursula
E. Bauer, PhD,
Chronic Disease Epidemiologist |
John
Werth, MA,
Bureau Education Coordinator |
Lisa
Conti, DVM, MPH,
State Public Health Veterinarian |
Regional Epidemiologists:
Dolly Katz,
PhD, MPH,
SE Florida |
Roger
Sanderson, RN, MA,
SW Florida |
Carina Blackmore, MS Vet. Med.,
PhD, NE Florida Carina Blackmore, MS Vet. Med., PhD, |
Zuber Mulla, MSPH, Central
Florida Carina Blackmore, MS Vet. Med., PhD, |
Gérard Krause,
MD, DTMH,
NW Florida |
Please print out this material and share with epidemiology staff,
county health department directors, administrators, medical directors, nursing directors,
environmental health directors and others with an interest in information of this type.
Thank you.
The Bureau of Epidemiology is available 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week for consultation at our main number (850/245-4401) PLEASE NOTE:
Consultation after 5 p.m. & on weekends is intended for emergencies.
In this Issue:
1. Hepatitis B Vaccine Now Available Without Thimerosal
2. Only Eleven More Days Until the Annual Statewide Epidemiology Seminar
(ASES)!
3. National Adult Immunization Awareness Week, October 10-16,1999
4. Encouraging News About Prostate Cancer Trends: Epi Grand Rounds for
September 21,1999
5. Confirmed Type-A Botulism Cases/Outbreak, Sarasota
County, Preliminary Report-September 14,1999
6. Florida Past: A Matter of Public Confidence
7. Weekly Disease Table: Week 36
1. Hepatitis B Vaccine Now Available Without Thimerosal
(The following article appeared in IAC Express #110 (serial online), September
10, 1999, published by the Immunization Action Coalition)
CDC PROVIDES NOTICE OF THE AVAILABILITY OF HEPATITIS
B VACCINE WHICH DOES NOT CONTAIN THIMEROSAL AS A PRESERVATIVE
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provided a notice to readers,
"Availability of Hepatitis B Vaccine That Does Not Contain Thimerosal as a
Preservative," in the September 10, 1999 issue of the MMWR. The authors state that
"the availability of hepatitis B vaccine that does not contain thimerosal as a
preservative should alert medical facilities to review their policies to ensure the
vaccination of newborns as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices, AAFP, and AAP." "Routine hepatitis B vaccination policies for all
newborn infants should be reintroduced immediately in hospitals in which these policies
and practices have been discontinued."
Because the availability of such vaccine should be of interest to all immunization
providers, the entire article is reprinted below.
On August 27, 1999, Merck Vaccine Division* (Merck & Co., Inc., West Point,
Pennsylvania) received approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of a
supplement to Merck's license application to include the manufacture of single-antigen
preservative-free hepatitis B vaccine (Recombivax HB, Pediatric); distribution is expected
to begin September 13, 1999. In addition, SmithKline Beecham Biologicals (SmithKline
Beecham, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), expects to make single-antigen preservative-free
hepatitis B vaccine (Engerix-B, Pediatric) available in the near future. Further product
information will be provided when it becomes available. Product packaging and labels will
indicate that these vaccines do not contain preservative.
To prevent shortages because of limited supplies of single-antigen hepatitis B vaccines
that do not contain thimerosal as a preservative and to assure prevention of perinatal and
early childhood hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection during the transition when both vaccines
that contain and do not contain thimerosal as a preservative are available, the following
three steps should be taken:
1. Newborn infants. The priority for use of single-antigen hepatitis B vaccines that do
not contain thimerosal as a preservative should be to vaccinate newborn infants. Routine
hepatitis B vaccination policies for all newborn infants should be reintroduced
immediately in hospitals in which these policies and practices have been discontinued. All
hospitals should ensure that newborn infants of hepatitis B surface antigen
(HBsAg)-positive mothers and of mothers whose HbsAg status is unknown receive their first
dose of hepatitis B vaccine within 12 hours of birth. If hepatitis B vaccine that does not
contain thimerosal as a preservative is not available, then thimerosal
preservative-containing vaccine should be used for these infants.
2. Infants aged less than 6 months. When available, hepatitis B vaccines that do not
contain thimerosal as a preservative should be used to vaccinate infants aged less than 6
months (single-antigen hepatitis B vaccine for infants aged less than 6 weeks and either
single-antigen or combination products for infants aged greater than or equal to 6 weeks).
Infants in groups at high risk for perinatal and early childhood HBV infections should
complete the three-dose hepatitis B vaccine series by age 6 months. When vaccines that do
not contain thimerosal as a preservative are not available, these groups should be
vaccinated with thimerosal preservative-containing vaccine. For infants born to
HBsAg-negative mothers and who are not in high-risk groups, existing recommendations
should be used for administering thimerosal preservative-containing hepatitis B vaccines
if vaccine that does not contain thimerosal as a preservative is not available (1-4).
These groups should complete the three-dose hepatitis B vaccine series by age 18 months.
3. Children aged greater than or equal to 6 months, adolescents, and adults. Thimerosal
preservative-containing hepatitis B vaccines can continue to be used for vaccinating
children aged greater than or equal to 6 months, adolescents, and adults as is recommended
(1-6).
Reported by: National Center for Infectious Diseases; National Immunization Program;
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry; National Center for Environmental
Health, CDC.
Editorial Note: On July 8, 1999, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and the
Public Health Service (PHS) released a joint statement about thimerosal in vaccines, and
the American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP) released a comparable statement (1-3).
Thimerosal is a mercury-containing preservative that has been used as an additive to
biologics and vaccines since the 1930s because it is effective in preventing bacterial and
fungal contamination, particularly in open multidose containers.
Vaccine manufacturers, FDA, and other PHS agencies are working together to replace
expeditiously thimerosal preservative-containing vaccines whenever possible with vaccines
that do not contain thimerosal as a preservative while ensuring maintenance of high
vaccination coverage levels and prevention of disease.
Previous recommendations for using thimerosal-containing vaccines indicated that
clinicians and parents could take advantage of the flexibility in the immunization
schedule to delay hepatitis B vaccination from birth until age 2-6 months for infants born
to mothers who are HBsAg negative (1-4). No changes were made in recommendations for
immunization at birth of infants of HBsAg-positive mothers or infants of mothers with an
unknown HBsAg status.
After the joint AAP/PHS statement on thimerosal, the AAP and CDC provided additional
implementation guidance (3,4). CDC guidance included hepatitis B vaccination should be
continued at birth for infants born to HBsAg-negative mothers belonging to populations or
groups that have a high risk for early childhood HBV infection, including Asian/Pacific
Islanders, immigrant populations from countries in which HBV infection is of high or
intermediate endemicity (7), and households with persons with chronic HBV infection. To
ensure the prevention of perinatal HBV transmission, hospitals should continue policies to
vaccinate all infants at birth until procedures are in place to guarantee that 1) the
HBsAg status of every pregnant woman is reviewed at delivery, 2) appropriate
passive-active immunoprophylaxis (hepatitis B immune globulin and hepatitis B vaccine) is
provided for infants of HBsAg-positive women within 12 hours of birth, and 3) appropriate
active immunoprophylaxis (hepatitis B vaccine) is provided for infants of women with an
unknown HBsAg status.
After the statements on thimerosal in vaccines were published, changes occurred in
newborn hepatitis B vaccination policies and practices in some hospitals, including
unintended changes affecting immunization of infants at risk for perinatal HBV
transmission. In August 1999, state and territorial health department hepatitis
coordinators conducted surveys of selected birthing hospitals in their project areas. Of
977 hospitals surveyed in 48 project areas, 773 (79%) were aware of the joint AAP/PHS
statement on thimerosal. Of 574 hospitals that were aware of the statement and had
existing policies or standing orders to vaccinate all newborns, 262 (46%) reported a
policy change to no longer routinely vaccinate newborns of HBsAg-negative mothers. In
addition, 52 (9%) reported they no longer routinely vaccinate any newborn (CDC,
unpublished data, 1999). Such a policy usually requires a physician's order to vaccinate
infants of HBsAg-positive mothers and infants of mothers whose HBsAg status is unknown.
CDC also has received anecdotal reports of hospitals in which policies were changed, and
infants born to HBsAg-positive mothers and infants born to mothers with unknown HBsAg
status were not vaccinated within 12 hours of birth (CDC, unpublished data,1999). Chronic
HBV infection develops in approximately 90% of infants infected perinatally; among
chronically infected infants, the risk for premature death from HBV-related liver cancer
or cirrhosis is approximately 25% (8). The availability of hepatitis B vaccine that does
not contain thimerosal as a preservative should alert medical facilities to review their
policies to ensure the vaccination of newborns as recommended by the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices, AAFP, and AAP.
References
1. CDC. Thimerosal in vaccines: a joint statement of the American Academy of Pediatrics
and the Public Health Service. MMWR 1999;48:563-5.
2. American Academy of Pediatrics. Thimerosal in vaccines: an interim report to
clinicians. AAP News 1999;15:10-2.
3. American Academy of Family Physicians. Policy statement of the American Academy of
Family Physicians on thimerosal in vaccines, July 8, 1999. Accessed September 3, 1999.
4. CDC. Implementation guidance for immunization grantees during the transition period
to vaccines without thimerosal, July 14, 1999.
Accessed September 3, 1999.
5. Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. Hepatitis B virus: a comprehensive
strategy for eliminating transmission in the United States through universal childhood
vaccination. MMWR 1991;40(no. RR-13).
6. CDC. Update: recommendations to prevent hepatitis B virus transmission--United
States. MMWR 1999;48:33-4.
7. CDC. Health information for international travel 1999-2000. Atlanta, Georgia: US
Department of Health and Human Services, 1999:98-102.
8. Margolis HS, Coleman PJ, Brown RE, Mast EE, Sheingold SH, Arevalo JA. Prevention of
hepatitis B virus transmission by immunization: an economic analysis of current
recommendations. JAMA 1995;274:1201-8.
* Use of trade names and commercial sources is for
identification only and does not imply endorsement by CDC
or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. ¨
2. Only Eleven More Days Until the Annual Statewide
Epidemiology Seminar (ASES)
Don't Forget to Register!
The time is rapidly approaching for the Annual Statewide Epidemiology Seminar
(September 30-October 1). We believe we have developed an interesting, informative and
challenging agenda, a list of exciting speakers and an excellent poster session, not to
mention time and occasion for colleagues to interact. Be sure to take advantage of this
once-a-year opportunity! Reserve your hotel room and register for the meeting early.
For those interested in laboratory issues related to epidemiology, a pre-seminar
meeting will be held on the evening of Wednesday, September 29th, for
participants to learn more about these issues. There is no registration fee for
this meeting. ¨
3. National Adult Immunization Awareness Week
Hank Janowski, Chief, Bureau of Immunization
October 10 through October 16, 1999, has been designated National Adult Immunization
Awareness Week. This annual event is organized to raise the awareness of public and
private health care professionals regarding the need for adults (particularly those at
high risk) to be immunized against influenza, pneumococcal pneumonia, and other
vaccine-preventable diseases. All adult health care providers are encouraged to
participate in this important campaign.
Regrettably, many adult Floridians remain unprotected against influenza and
pneumococcal pneumonia which together are the nations fifth leading cause of death
for older adults. For countless others, hepatitis B, tetanus, diphtheria, and other
vaccine-preventable diseases pose a continued threat.
In order to build and maintain a well-immunized adult client population, medical
providers should take advantage of routine physician visits and daily clinic opportunities
to provide immunizations. Every adult visit should include an assessment of the
clients immunization status, a discussion of their vaccine needs, and provision of
the appropriate immunizations or referral to a health care provider as indicated.
The following three publications contain important information related to adult
immunizations and are available on the internet:
1. The Adult Immunization Schedule, based on recommendations of the Advisory Committee
on Immunization Practices (ACIP).
2. A Summary of Recommendations for Adult Immunizations can be found on the
Immunization Action Coalition Coalition's website.
3. The Standards for Adult Immunization Practice, as
established by the National Coalition for Adult Immunization.
Bureau of Immunization field staff are also available to assist county health
departments and other interested groups in promoting National Adult Immunization
Awareness Week in local communities and the media. If you have any questions or
need assistance in publicizing this event, please contact Ms. Linda Zeigler,
Bureau of Immunization.. ¨
4. Encouraging News About Prostate Cancer Trends:
Epidemiology Grand Rounds for September 28, 1999
John F. Werth, M.A., Education Coordinator, Bureau of Epidemiology
Topic: Florida Prostate Cancer Incidence and Mortality Analyzed by
Race and Age
Presenter: Daniel R. Thompson, M.P.H., Bureau of Epidemiology,
Florida Department of Health
Abstract: Prostate cancer screening and treatment continues to be a controversial
subject. There is little doubt that recent improvements in screening methods have
increased the number of prostate cancers detected. However, the trend in mortality rates
has been almost completely independent of the trends in incidence and stage at diagnosis.
Additionally, in comparison to white men, black men are at greater risk of being diagnosed
with prostate cancer and are also at greater risk of dying from prostate cancer once they
are diagnosed.
The purpose of this presentation is to first describe the trends over time in prostate
cancer incidence, stage at diagnosis, and mortality rates. Differences in the mortality
rates for black men versus white men will then be analyzed and separated into differences
due to increased risk of getting prostate cancer and differences due to increased risk of
dying from prostate cancer once it is diagnosed. Separating and analyzing the rate
differences in this way is useful because differences due to increased incidence are
affected by reducing risk factors and differences due to risk of dying from the disease
once it is diagnosed, are affected more by screening and treatment.
At the conclusion of this presentation, the participant(s) should understand the data
related controversy regarding prostate cancer screening and treatment, and also be aware
of the differences in the rates for black and white men and the components of these
differences.
Time: 11:00 AM 12:00 PM EST
The PowerPoint slideshow for the audio-conference will be posted to the DOH Intranet
web site. For further information regarding the audio-conference series, please contact
John Werth.
Grand Rounds Audio-conference Guidelines:
To minimize distractions and disruptions, please remember never to call in with a
cellular telephone or cordless headset and to use your telephone "mute button"
on during the call (except when asking questions), and please do not put your telephone on
"hold" during the call. Please call in on time.
The Epidemiology Grand Rounds, a monthly, one hour audio-conference conducted by the
Bureau of Epidemiology, focuses on issues of epidemiologic interest to Florida public
health providers, including county health department directors and administrators, nursing
directors and nurse epidemiologists, laboratorians, and other interested parties. Each
session features a formal PowerPoint presentation followed by an opportunity for audience
interaction. The
following dates are the remaining grand rounds for 1999: September 21, October 26,
November 30, and December 28. ¨
5. Confirmed Type-A Botulism Cases/Outbreak, Sarasota County,
(Preliminary Report - September 14,1999)
Fran Pagen, R.N., MS, CIC Sarasota County Health Department;
Mike Friedman, M.P.H. Florida Bureau of Environmental Epidemiology;
Quintin Clark - Sarasota County Health Department
Introduction and Background
On September 11,1999 the Sarasota County Health Department (CHD) was informed that two
females, 79 and 52 years old, were admitted to a local hospital with neurological symptoms
suggestive of botulism. The patients are mother and daughter who had shared a common
dinner meal on September 8th and became ill the following day. Food items at
the dinner meal shared by the patients included roasted chicken, baked stuffed potato,
garden salad (lettuce, tomato, green onions, mushrooms) with home prepared dressing, and
home bottled garlic infused oil and soy milk. A third person (the husband of the
52-year-old female) had also attended this meal and became symptomatic on September 12th.
He was also hospitalized. The third person's meal did not include roasted
chicken, soy milk and home prepared salad dressing. This individuals meal included
shrimp and oil from home bottled garlic as salad dressing. The three patients have since
received botulism anti-toxin from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Methodology
An investigation of this outbreak by the Sarasota CHD and the Bureau of Environmental
Epidemiology is currently underway. Serum and gastric specimens were collected and sent to
the CDC Botulism Laboratory by the Sarasota Hospital. Food histories from all persons
involved were collected by CHD staff. Food samples from the identified common dinner meal
were collected and also shipped to the CDC Botulism Laboratory for analysis. The home
garlic oil was prepared by a neighbor. The ill family had tasted a similar product bought
at a market and asked the neighbor to make them some. The neighbor also gave bottles to
other friends and neighbors. The following steps were followed, per the neighbor who made
the infused oil:
- Jars were washed in a home dishwasher.
- Sprigs of rosemary and thyme were placed in the hot jars.
- The jar was filled with whole cloves of pre-peeled, pre-packaged Christopher Ranch
garlic.
- The jar was filled to within 1/2 inch of the top with olive oil.
- The jar lids and rings were boiled in water. While still hot they were removed from the
boiling water with a magnetic tool.
- The jar lids and rings were then placed on the jars.
- The entire jar was placed in boiling water for 25 minutes.
- The jars of the product were allowed to cool at room temperature.
- The rings were removed from the jar and dried. The lid remained intact during this
process.
- The jar and lid were washed with detergent and water.
- The dried rings were replaced on the jars.
- The product is set on a shelf at room temperature for later use.
The canner purchased a 20 pound bag of garlic on August 10,1999 that was used in the
preparation of 50 jars of product. The jars are of various sizes. The canner distributed
jars of the product to friends and neighbors as a gift.
Results
On September 14,1999, the CDC notified all departments involved that both female
patients tested positive for type-A botulism. In addition, garlic cloves from the garlic
infused oil tested positive for botulism toxin type A. Final laboratory results are
expected later this week.
So far, 48 pints plus 2 quarts of the oil have been retrieved by the Environmental
Health Section of the Sarasota CHD. Remaining are 5 quarts and 1 pint that were either
disposed of by the individuals before the CHD could obtain them or the CHD is still trying
to contact them. The remaining product will be disposed of by incineration in a
biohazardous waste incinerator.
Analysis and Conclusion
The Department of Health is awaiting final laboratory results at this time. Infused
oils have been implicated in botulism outbreaks in the United States as well as other
countries. As a result of previous outbreaks in Vancouver, BC (Canada) and in the State of
New York, the FDA Food Code now requires two barriers in the destruction of spores and in
the prevention of toxin production in a commercial product of this type (reduced oxygen
packaging): 1) destruction of the spores by heat (thermal processing) and 2) inhibition of
toxin production by altering the food through acidification, controlling aw
(water activity), the use of salt and preservatives, or refrigeration. Also, it is because
some single barriers can result in a product unacceptable to consumers that multiple
barriers are used. The common 2nd barrier in infused oil of this kind is
acidification via phosphoric or citric acid, for example. The pH of the final product
should be 4.6 or less. ¨
6. Florida Past - A Matter of Public Confidence
William J. Bigler, PhD
Throughout the long history of the State Board of Health (1889-1969), the Annual
Reports focus on the accomplishments of the agency Executive Officer, or State Health
Officer, and his key staff. The president of the board, as a rule , usually penned a
rather bland "letter of transmittal" to forward the report to the Governor. But
the Legislature of 1909 stirred things up a bit. That year they diverted $60,000 of the
Boards budget to "relieve a financial stringency in another department of State
government." Thus, a "long anticipated
plan to establish a sanitarium for
the indigent tuberculous citizens of Florida had to be deferred." In February 1910,
when E. M. Henry as President of the Board sent the 1909 Annual Report to Albert W.
Gilchrist, he reminded the Governor just how important public health was to the
development and well being of Florida. Some choice excerpts from his letter follow:
It is not my purpose to more than direct
your attention to certain features of this report which to me are particularly interesting
from a business mans point of view and which seem to bear especially upon the
State-wide influence which the Board has induced during the past twenty-years and from
which great good has resulted to the people both educationally and practically.
It is a well known fact that prior to the great epidemic of yellow fever in 1888 the
increase in the States population from immigration was almost inappreciable compared
with the gain since the period mentioned. It is within the memory of even our younger
people that as each summer came there was talk of yellow fever, its probability of
occurrence and the point where it would first make its appearance. This periodic agitation
of a subject which vitally interested not only the physical life of the citizen, but his
business existence as well, brought about conditions which yearly disturbed home comfort
and retarded the coming of people into the state, besides restricting investment capital,
so necessary to develop many important industries and avenues of commerce which held our
flattering returns. People were scary, and naturally so in placing their money where
health conditions were so uncertain and where an epidemic of yellow fever depressed values
to a degree that it would take years of exemption to recover from
Compare the condition existing in the State in 1888 with an epidemic of yellow fever in
Jacksonville, and the conditions which prevailed in 1905 with an epidemic of the same
disease in Pensacola, Fla. In the former instance panic prevailed; every mans hand
was raised against his neighbor of adjoining counties, under a false supposition of
protection against an unseen enemy; commerce was strangled and stagnation of business
followed. In 1905 in the latter instance without a ten-mile area around
Pensacola, travel within the State was undisturbed. Business followed its usual methods
and there was no panic, no excitement, no hysteria of even those most skeptical of the
ability of the State Board of Health to cope with the situation and confine the disease to
one point in the State
These facts are mentioned to you, not in a boastful way, but to emphasize the growth of
confidence on the part of the people in an institution which the people themselves in
their wisdom had provided for in the Constitutional Convention of 1885
Is it unreasonable, therefore, to argue or to maintain that the part played in the
wonderful development of Florida since 1888 has not been due very largely to a confidence
in the safety of living in the State, which
has been inspired by the work which the
State Board of Health has done along health lines and
is still earnestly engaged
in?
I do not say or pretend to assert that the State Board of Health has been the
only factor in the strides which Florida has made towards financial development in the
past twenty years, but I do maintain without fear of successful contradiction, that the
Board has contributed a large share to the success which the State now enjoys, and it will
be recognized in the future, if not already so considered, as an investment on the part of
the people which should be allowed the greatest latitude of administration.
Editorial Note: Even today the Department of Health (DOH) and County Health
Departments (CHDs) continue to maintain the confidence of the public, both visitors
and residents alike, when outbreaks of infectious disease threaten the state. It takes an
enormous amount of effort and resources to respond to and contain outbreaks even if they
are localized. Now, with increasing opportunities for travel, it is not unusual to have
cases from a point source outbreak quickly spread throughout the world. The control of
multi-county foodborne outbreaks by products from other states and countries also
continues to present interesting challenges.
Still, perhaps the most dramatic statewide outbreaks we have had to deal with in recent
years have been caused by the mosquito-borne St. Louis Encephalitis (SLE) virus. This is
one agent that can still cause public panic for several months as well as impact the
states economy. Fortunately, we have a well conceived multi-agency plan for the
surveillance and control of SLE and great deal of experience in providing the public with
timely and credible information during an outbreak. We hope to continue to maintain public
confidence as we prepare for bioterrorism attacks, an influenza pandemic and outbreaks of
other emerging infectious diseases. ¨
7. Weekly Disease Table: Week 36
County-Confirmed Cases, Sorted Alphabetically by Disease
(NR represents years that the disease lacked status as a reportable condition)
DISEASE |
1996 TO DATE |
1997 TO DATE |
1998 TO DATE |
3 YEAR AVERAGE
TO DATE |
1998 TOTAL CASES |
1999 TO DATE |
| Amebiasis |
54 |
39 |
46 |
46.3 |
91 |
34 |
| Anthrax |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Botulism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Brucellosis |
5 |
0 |
2 |
2.3 |
3 |
1 |
| Campylobacteriosis |
797 |
685 |
514 |
665.3 |
975 |
628 |
| Ciguatera |
8 |
6 |
7 |
7 |
7 |
2 |
| Cryptosporidiosis |
138 |
81 |
97 |
105.3 |
203 |
91 |
| Cyclosporiasis |
180 |
64 |
6 |
83.3 |
6 |
5 |
| Dengue |
0 |
3 |
2 |
1.7 |
5 |
2 |
| Diphtheria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| E. coli O157:H7 |
23 |
38 |
28 |
29.7 |
57 |
38 |
| E. coli, other (known serotype) |
3 |
5 |
3 |
3.7 |
12 |
12 |
| Ehrlichiosis, Human |
4 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
| Encephalitis, Eastern Equine |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0.7 |
0 |
0 |
| Encephalitis, St. Louis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
| Encephalitis, other (known organism) |
5 |
8 |
3 |
5.3 |
7 |
3 |
| Encephalitis, post-infectious1 |
13 |
6 |
8 |
9 |
21 |
5 |
| Giardiasis (acute) |
1210 |
1017 |
905 |
1044 |
1636 |
724 |
| Haemophilus influenzae, invasive1 |
15 |
17 |
30 |
20.7 |
45 |
32 |
| Hansens Disease (Leprosy) |
1 |
0 |
3 |
1.3 |
4 |
2 |
| Hantavirus Infection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome |
0 |
3 |
8 |
3.7 |
12 |
6 |
| Hemorrhagic Fever |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Hepatitis A |
304 |
332 |
340 |
325.3 |
539 |
451 |
| Hepatitis B |
347 |
259 |
272 |
292.7 |
466 |
285 |
| Hepatitis C2 |
NR |
NR |
NR |
NR |
NR |
39 |
| Hepatitis Non-A, Non-B |
58 |
60 |
63 |
60.3 |
95 |
5 |
| Hepatitis, perinatal B2 |
NR |
NR |
NR |
NR |
NR |
1 |
| Hepatitis, unspecified |
3 |
5 |
11 |
6.3 |
26 |
11 |
| Hepatitis, +HBsAg, pregnant woman2 |
NR |
NR |
NR |
NR |
NR |
15 |
| Lead Poisoning |
1324 |
949 |
1217 |
1163.3 |
1805 |
474 |
| Legionellosis |
26 |
18 |
24 |
22.7 |
48 |
17 |
| Leptospirosis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0.3 |
2 |
0 |
| Listeriosis2 |
NR |
NR |
NR |
NR |
NR |
18 |
| Lyme Disease |
13 |
22 |
27 |
20.7 |
71 |
28 |
| Malaria |
57 |
55 |
41 |
51 |
96 |
59 |
| Measles |
1 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Meningococcal Disease (N. meningitidis) |
137 |
111 |
95 |
114.3 |
133 |
81 |
| Meningitis, Group B Streptococci |
19 |
11 |
11 |
13.7 |
22 |
11 |
| Meningitis, Haemophilus influenzae1 |
5 |
6 |
11 |
7.3 |
12 |
11 |
| Meningitis, Streptococcus pneumoniae |
76 |
55 |
61 |
64 |
96 |
74 |
| Meningitis, Listeria monocytogenes |
4 |
2 |
4 |
3.3 |
13 |
5 |
| Meningitis, other bacterial (including
unspecified) |
76 |
40 |
41 |
52.3 |
75 |
45 |
| Mercury Poisoning |
5 |
2 |
0 |
2.3 |
4 |
2 |
| Mumps |
6 |
8 |
10 |
8 |
11 |
3 |
| Neurotoxic Shellfish Poisoning2 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
| Pertussis |
68 |
51 |
33 |
50.7 |
39 |
60 |
| Pesticide Poisoning |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0.7 |
1 |
1 |
| Plague |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Poliomyelitis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Psittacosis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0.3 |
2 |
0 |
| Rabies, Animal |
162 |
200 |
146 |
169.3 |
215 |
135 |
| Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1.3 |
2 |
2 |
| Rubella, including congenital |
10 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
4 |
0 |
| Salmonellosis |
1472 |
1280 |
1531 |
1427.7 |
3038 |
1580 |
| Shigellosis |
975 |
859 |
1437 |
1090.3 |
2343 |
934 |
| Smallpox2 |
NR |
NR |
NR |
NR |
NR |
0 |
| Staphlococcus aureus, (GISA/VISA)2 |
NR |
NR |
NR |
NR |
NR |
0 |
| Staphlococcus aureus, (GRSA/VRSA)2 |
NR |
NR |
NR |
NR |
NR |
0 |
| Streptococcal Disease, invasive Group A |
2 |
25 |
32 |
19.7 |
57 |
56 |
| Streptococcus pneumoniae, invasive
disease |
7 |
138 |
304 |
149.7 |
493 |
427 |
| Tetanus |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1.3 |
3 |
2 |
| Toxic Shock Syndrome |
0 |
1 |
4 |
1.7 |
4 |
4 |
| Toxoplasmosis |
6 |
4 |
7 |
5.7 |
15 |
10 |
| Typhoid Fever |
19 |
8 |
11 |
12.7 |
16 |
22 |
| Vibrio cholerae (serogrp O1) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Vibrio cholerae (serogrp Non-O1) |
2 |
6 |
6 |
4.7 |
11 |
8 |
| Vibrio vulnificus |
7 |
11 |
19 |
12.3 |
35 |
12 |
| Vibrio other (including unspecified) |
16 |
21 |
53 |
30 |
73 |
30 |
| Yellow Fever |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 Haemophilus influenzae can be the agent responsible for disease under
three of the reportable conditions listed-: "Haemophilus influenzae,
invasive" and under "Encephalitis, post infectious." Cases of Haemophilus
influenzae meningitis are reported under "Meningitis, H. influenzae."
2 The reportable disease rule was revised in July, 1999. Kawasaki Disease,
Histoplasmosis, Reye Syndrome, and Typhus were deleted from the weekly disease table since
cases are no longer reportable as of July 4, 1999. Hepatitis C; perinatal hepatitis B;
hepatitis B +HbsAg, pregnant woman; listeriosis; smallpox, S. aureus (GISA/VISA) and S.
aureus (GRSA/VRSA) were added to the reporting requirements as of July 4, 1999. Paralytic
shellfish poisoning is now referred to as neurotoxic shellfish poisoning.
|