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DOHLOGO.GIF (7396 bytes)EPI UPDATE

A weekly publication by the Bureau of Epidemiology

For September 17, 1999

"The reason for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information on a disease is to control that disease. Collection and analysis should not be allowed to consume resources if action does not follow."

--Foege WH et al. Int. J of Epidemiology 1976; 5:29-37.

Richard S. Hopkins, MD, MSPH, Bureau Chief, State Epidemiologist

Don Ward, Surveillance Section Administrator, Epi Update Managing Editor

Jill H. Parker, MSP, Epi Update Editor

Bureau of Epidemiology Frequent Contributors:

Steven Wiersma, MD, MPH,

Deputy State Epidemiologist

William J. Bigler, PhD, MS,

Senior Epidemiologist

Jodi Baldy, MPH,

Biological Scientist IV

Ursula E. Bauer, PhD,

Chronic Disease Epidemiologist

John Werth, MA,

Bureau Education Coordinator

Lisa Conti, DVM, MPH,

State Public Health Veterinarian

Regional Epidemiologists:

Dolly Katz, PhD, MPH,

SE Florida

Roger Sanderson, RN, MA,

SW Florida

Carina Blackmore, MS Vet. Med., PhD,

NE Florida Carina Blackmore, MS Vet. Med., PhD,

Zuber Mulla, MSPH,

Central Florida Carina Blackmore, MS Vet. Med., PhD,

Gérard Krause, MD, DTMH,

NW Florida

Please print out this material and share with epidemiology staff, county health department directors, administrators, medical directors, nursing directors, environmental health directors and others with an interest in information of this type. Thank you.

The Bureau of Epidemiology is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for consultation at our main number (850/245-4401) PLEASE NOTE: Consultation after 5 p.m. & on weekends is intended for emergencies.

In this Issue:

1. Hepatitis B Vaccine Now Available Without Thimerosal

2. Only Eleven More Days Until the Annual Statewide Epidemiology Seminar (ASES)!

3. National Adult Immunization Awareness Week, October 10-16,1999

4. Encouraging News About Prostate Cancer Trends: Epi Grand Rounds for September 21,1999

5. Confirmed Type-A Botulism Cases/Outbreak, Sarasota County, Preliminary Report-September 14,1999

6. Florida Past: A Matter of Public Confidence

7. Weekly Disease Table: Week 36

1. Hepatitis B Vaccine Now Available Without Thimerosal

(The following article appeared in IAC Express #110 (serial online), September 10, 1999, published by the Immunization Action Coalition)

CDC PROVIDES NOTICE OF THE AVAILABILITY OF HEPATITIS B VACCINE WHICH DOES NOT CONTAIN THIMEROSAL AS A PRESERVATIVE

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provided a notice to readers, "Availability of Hepatitis B Vaccine That Does Not Contain Thimerosal as a Preservative," in the September 10, 1999 issue of the MMWR. The authors state that "the availability of hepatitis B vaccine that does not contain thimerosal as a preservative should alert medical facilities to review their policies to ensure the vaccination of newborns as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, AAFP, and AAP." "Routine hepatitis B vaccination policies for all newborn infants should be reintroduced immediately in hospitals in which these policies and practices have been discontinued."

Because the availability of such vaccine should be of interest to all immunization providers, the entire article is reprinted below.

On August 27, 1999, Merck Vaccine Division* (Merck & Co., Inc., West Point, Pennsylvania) received approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of a supplement to Merck's license application to include the manufacture of single-antigen preservative-free hepatitis B vaccine (Recombivax HB, Pediatric); distribution is expected to begin September 13, 1999. In addition, SmithKline Beecham Biologicals (SmithKline Beecham, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), expects to make single-antigen preservative-free hepatitis B vaccine (Engerix-B, Pediatric) available in the near future. Further product information will be provided when it becomes available. Product packaging and labels will indicate that these vaccines do not contain preservative.

To prevent shortages because of limited supplies of single-antigen hepatitis B vaccines that do not contain thimerosal as a preservative and to assure prevention of perinatal and early childhood hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection during the transition when both vaccines that contain and do not contain thimerosal as a preservative are available, the following three steps should be taken:

1. Newborn infants. The priority for use of single-antigen hepatitis B vaccines that do not contain thimerosal as a preservative should be to vaccinate newborn infants. Routine hepatitis B vaccination policies for all newborn infants should be reintroduced immediately in hospitals in which these policies and practices have been discontinued. All hospitals should ensure that newborn infants of hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg)-positive mothers and of mothers whose HbsAg status is unknown receive their first dose of hepatitis B vaccine within 12 hours of birth. If hepatitis B vaccine that does not contain thimerosal as a preservative is not available, then thimerosal preservative-containing vaccine should be used for these infants.

2. Infants aged less than 6 months. When available, hepatitis B vaccines that do not contain thimerosal as a preservative should be used to vaccinate infants aged less than 6 months (single-antigen hepatitis B vaccine for infants aged less than 6 weeks and either single-antigen or combination products for infants aged greater than or equal to 6 weeks). Infants in groups at high risk for perinatal and early childhood HBV infections should complete the three-dose hepatitis B vaccine series by age 6 months. When vaccines that do not contain thimerosal as a preservative are not available, these groups should be vaccinated with thimerosal preservative-containing vaccine. For infants born to HBsAg-negative mothers and who are not in high-risk groups, existing recommendations should be used for administering thimerosal preservative-containing hepatitis B vaccines if vaccine that does not contain thimerosal as a preservative is not available (1-4). These groups should complete the three-dose hepatitis B vaccine series by age 18 months.

3. Children aged greater than or equal to 6 months, adolescents, and adults. Thimerosal preservative-containing hepatitis B vaccines can continue to be used for vaccinating children aged greater than or equal to 6 months, adolescents, and adults as is recommended (1-6).

Reported by: National Center for Infectious Diseases; National Immunization Program; Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry; National Center for Environmental Health, CDC.

Editorial Note: On July 8, 1999, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and the Public Health Service (PHS) released a joint statement about thimerosal in vaccines, and the American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP) released a comparable statement (1-3). Thimerosal is a mercury-containing preservative that has been used as an additive to biologics and vaccines since the 1930s because it is effective in preventing bacterial and fungal contamination, particularly in open multidose containers.

Vaccine manufacturers, FDA, and other PHS agencies are working together to replace expeditiously thimerosal preservative-containing vaccines whenever possible with vaccines that do not contain thimerosal as a preservative while ensuring maintenance of high vaccination coverage levels and prevention of disease.

Previous recommendations for using thimerosal-containing vaccines indicated that clinicians and parents could take advantage of the flexibility in the immunization schedule to delay hepatitis B vaccination from birth until age 2-6 months for infants born to mothers who are HBsAg negative (1-4). No changes were made in recommendations for immunization at birth of infants of HBsAg-positive mothers or infants of mothers with an unknown HBsAg status.

After the joint AAP/PHS statement on thimerosal, the AAP and CDC provided additional implementation guidance (3,4). CDC guidance included hepatitis B vaccination should be continued at birth for infants born to HBsAg-negative mothers belonging to populations or groups that have a high risk for early childhood HBV infection, including Asian/Pacific Islanders, immigrant populations from countries in which HBV infection is of high or intermediate endemicity (7), and households with persons with chronic HBV infection. To ensure the prevention of perinatal HBV transmission, hospitals should continue policies to vaccinate all infants at birth until procedures are in place to guarantee that 1) the HBsAg status of every pregnant woman is reviewed at delivery, 2) appropriate passive-active immunoprophylaxis (hepatitis B immune globulin and hepatitis B vaccine) is provided for infants of HBsAg-positive women within 12 hours of birth, and 3) appropriate active immunoprophylaxis (hepatitis B vaccine) is provided for infants of women with an unknown HBsAg status.

After the statements on thimerosal in vaccines were published, changes occurred in newborn hepatitis B vaccination policies and practices in some hospitals, including unintended changes affecting immunization of infants at risk for perinatal HBV transmission. In August 1999, state and territorial health department hepatitis coordinators conducted surveys of selected birthing hospitals in their project areas. Of 977 hospitals surveyed in 48 project areas, 773 (79%) were aware of the joint AAP/PHS statement on thimerosal. Of 574 hospitals that were aware of the statement and had existing policies or standing orders to vaccinate all newborns, 262 (46%) reported a policy change to no longer routinely vaccinate newborns of HBsAg-negative mothers. In addition, 52 (9%) reported they no longer routinely vaccinate any newborn (CDC, unpublished data, 1999). Such a policy usually requires a physician's order to vaccinate infants of HBsAg-positive mothers and infants of mothers whose HBsAg status is unknown. CDC also has received anecdotal reports of hospitals in which policies were changed, and infants born to HBsAg-positive mothers and infants born to mothers with unknown HBsAg status were not vaccinated within 12 hours of birth (CDC, unpublished data,1999). Chronic HBV infection develops in approximately 90% of infants infected perinatally; among chronically infected infants, the risk for premature death from HBV-related liver cancer or cirrhosis is approximately 25% (8). The availability of hepatitis B vaccine that does not contain thimerosal as a preservative should alert medical facilities to review their policies to ensure the vaccination of newborns as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, AAFP, and AAP.

References

1. CDC. Thimerosal in vaccines: a joint statement of the American Academy of Pediatrics and the Public Health Service. MMWR 1999;48:563-5.

2. American Academy of Pediatrics. Thimerosal in vaccines: an interim report to clinicians. AAP News 1999;15:10-2.

3. American Academy of Family Physicians. Policy statement of the American Academy of Family Physicians on thimerosal in vaccines, July 8, 1999. Accessed September 3, 1999.

4. CDC. Implementation guidance for immunization grantees during the transition period to vaccines without thimerosal, July 14, 1999.

Accessed September 3, 1999.

5. Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. Hepatitis B virus: a comprehensive strategy for eliminating transmission in the United States through universal childhood vaccination. MMWR 1991;40(no. RR-13).

6. CDC. Update: recommendations to prevent hepatitis B virus transmission--United States. MMWR 1999;48:33-4.

7. CDC. Health information for international travel 1999-2000. Atlanta, Georgia: US Department of Health and Human Services, 1999:98-102.

8. Margolis HS, Coleman PJ, Brown RE, Mast EE, Sheingold SH, Arevalo JA. Prevention of hepatitis B virus transmission by immunization: an economic analysis of current recommendations. JAMA 1995;274:1201-8.

* Use of trade names and commercial sources is for

identification only and does not imply endorsement by CDC

or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. ¨

2. Only Eleven More Days Until the Annual Statewide

Epidemiology Seminar (ASES)…Don't Forget to Register!

The time is rapidly approaching for the Annual Statewide Epidemiology Seminar (September 30-October 1). We believe we have developed an interesting, informative and challenging agenda, a list of exciting speakers and an excellent poster session, not to mention time and occasion for colleagues to interact. Be sure to take advantage of this once-a-year opportunity! Reserve your hotel room and register for the meeting early.

For those interested in laboratory issues related to epidemiology, a pre-seminar meeting will be held on the evening of Wednesday, September 29th, for participants to learn more about these issues. There is no registration fee for this meeting. ¨

3. National Adult Immunization Awareness Week

Hank Janowski, Chief, Bureau of Immunization

October 10 through October 16, 1999, has been designated National Adult Immunization Awareness Week. This annual event is organized to raise the awareness of public and private health care professionals regarding the need for adults (particularly those at high risk) to be immunized against influenza, pneumococcal pneumonia, and other vaccine-preventable diseases. All adult health care providers are encouraged to participate in this important campaign.

Regrettably, many adult Floridians remain unprotected against influenza and pneumococcal pneumonia which together are the nation’s fifth leading cause of death for older adults. For countless others, hepatitis B, tetanus, diphtheria, and other vaccine-preventable diseases pose a continued threat.

In order to build and maintain a well-immunized adult client population, medical providers should take advantage of routine physician visits and daily clinic opportunities to provide immunizations. Every adult visit should include an assessment of the client’s immunization status, a discussion of their vaccine needs, and provision of the appropriate immunizations or referral to a health care provider as indicated.

The following three publications contain important information related to adult immunizations and are available on the internet:

1. The Adult Immunization Schedule, based on recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP).

2. A Summary of Recommendations for Adult Immunizations can be found on the Immunization Action Coalition Coalition's website.

3. The Standards for Adult Immunization Practice, as established by the National Coalition for Adult Immunization.

Bureau of Immunization field staff are also available to assist county health departments and other interested groups in promoting National Adult Immunization Awareness Week in local communities and the media. If you have any questions or need assistance in publicizing this event, please contact Ms. Linda Zeigler, Bureau of Immunization..¨

4. Encouraging News About Prostate Cancer Trends:

Epidemiology Grand Rounds for September 28, 1999

John F. Werth, M.A., Education Coordinator, Bureau of Epidemiology

Topic: Florida Prostate Cancer Incidence and Mortality Analyzed by

Race and Age

Presenter: Daniel R. Thompson, M.P.H., Bureau of Epidemiology,

Florida Department of Health

Abstract: Prostate cancer screening and treatment continues to be a controversial subject. There is little doubt that recent improvements in screening methods have increased the number of prostate cancers detected. However, the trend in mortality rates has been almost completely independent of the trends in incidence and stage at diagnosis. Additionally, in comparison to white men, black men are at greater risk of being diagnosed with prostate cancer and are also at greater risk of dying from prostate cancer once they are diagnosed.

The purpose of this presentation is to first describe the trends over time in prostate cancer incidence, stage at diagnosis, and mortality rates. Differences in the mortality rates for black men versus white men will then be analyzed and separated into differences due to increased risk of getting prostate cancer and differences due to increased risk of dying from prostate cancer once it is diagnosed. Separating and analyzing the rate differences in this way is useful because differences due to increased incidence are affected by reducing risk factors and differences due to risk of dying from the disease once it is diagnosed, are affected more by screening and treatment.

At the conclusion of this presentation, the participant(s) should understand the data related controversy regarding prostate cancer screening and treatment, and also be aware of the differences in the rates for black and white men and the components of these differences.

Time: 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM EST

The PowerPoint slideshow for the audio-conference will be posted to the DOH Intranet web site. For further information regarding the audio-conference series, please contact John Werth.

Grand Rounds Audio-conference Guidelines:

To minimize distractions and disruptions, please remember never to call in with a cellular telephone or cordless headset and to use your telephone "mute button" on during the call (except when asking questions), and please do not put your telephone on "hold" during the call. Please call in on time.

The Epidemiology Grand Rounds, a monthly, one hour audio-conference conducted by the Bureau of Epidemiology, focuses on issues of epidemiologic interest to Florida public health providers, including county health department directors and administrators, nursing directors and nurse epidemiologists, laboratorians, and other interested parties. Each session features a formal PowerPoint presentation followed by an opportunity for audience interaction. The following dates are the remaining grand rounds for 1999: September 21, October 26, November 30, and December 28.¨

5. Confirmed Type-A Botulism Cases/Outbreak, Sarasota County, (Preliminary Report - September 14,1999)

Fran Pagen, R.N., MS, CIC – Sarasota County Health Department;

Mike Friedman, M.P.H. – Florida Bureau of Environmental Epidemiology;

Quintin Clark - Sarasota County Health Department

Introduction and Background

On September 11,1999 the Sarasota County Health Department (CHD) was informed that two females, 79 and 52 years old, were admitted to a local hospital with neurological symptoms suggestive of botulism. The patients are mother and daughter who had shared a common dinner meal on September 8th and became ill the following day. Food items at the dinner meal shared by the patients included roasted chicken, baked stuffed potato, garden salad (lettuce, tomato, green onions, mushrooms) with home prepared dressing, and home bottled garlic infused oil and soy milk. A third person (the husband of the 52-year-old female) had also attended this meal and became symptomatic on September 12th. He was also hospitalized. The third person's meal did not include roasted chicken, soy milk and home prepared salad dressing. This individual’s meal included shrimp and oil from home bottled garlic as salad dressing. The three patients have since received botulism anti-toxin from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Methodology

An investigation of this outbreak by the Sarasota CHD and the Bureau of Environmental Epidemiology is currently underway. Serum and gastric specimens were collected and sent to the CDC Botulism Laboratory by the Sarasota Hospital. Food histories from all persons involved were collected by CHD staff. Food samples from the identified common dinner meal were collected and also shipped to the CDC Botulism Laboratory for analysis. The home garlic oil was prepared by a neighbor. The ill family had tasted a similar product bought at a market and asked the neighbor to make them some. The neighbor also gave bottles to other friends and neighbors. The following steps were followed, per the neighbor who made the infused oil:

  1. Jars were washed in a home dishwasher.
  2. Sprigs of rosemary and thyme were placed in the hot jars.
  3. The jar was filled with whole cloves of pre-peeled, pre-packaged Christopher Ranch garlic.
  4. The jar was filled to within 1/2 inch of the top with olive oil.
  5. The jar lids and rings were boiled in water. While still hot they were removed from the boiling water with a magnetic tool.
  6. The jar lids and rings were then placed on the jars.
  7. The entire jar was placed in boiling water for 25 minutes.
  8. The jars of the product were allowed to cool at room temperature.
  9. The rings were removed from the jar and dried. The lid remained intact during this process.
  10. The jar and lid were washed with detergent and water.
  11. The dried rings were replaced on the jars.
  12. The product is set on a shelf at room temperature for later use.

The canner purchased a 20 pound bag of garlic on August 10,1999 that was used in the preparation of 50 jars of product. The jars are of various sizes. The canner distributed jars of the product to friends and neighbors as a gift.

Results

On September 14,1999, the CDC notified all departments involved that both female patients tested positive for type-A botulism. In addition, garlic cloves from the garlic infused oil tested positive for botulism toxin type A. Final laboratory results are expected later this week.

So far, 48 pints plus 2 quarts of the oil have been retrieved by the Environmental Health Section of the Sarasota CHD. Remaining are 5 quarts and 1 pint that were either disposed of by the individuals before the CHD could obtain them or the CHD is still trying to contact them. The remaining product will be disposed of by incineration in a biohazardous waste incinerator.

Analysis and Conclusion

The Department of Health is awaiting final laboratory results at this time. Infused oils have been implicated in botulism outbreaks in the United States as well as other countries. As a result of previous outbreaks in Vancouver, BC (Canada) and in the State of New York, the FDA Food Code now requires two barriers in the destruction of spores and in the prevention of toxin production in a commercial product of this type (reduced oxygen packaging): 1) destruction of the spores by heat (thermal processing) and 2) inhibition of toxin production by altering the food through acidification, controlling aw (water activity), the use of salt and preservatives, or refrigeration. Also, it is because some single barriers can result in a product unacceptable to consumers that multiple barriers are used. The common 2nd barrier in infused oil of this kind is acidification via phosphoric or citric acid, for example. The pH of the final product should be 4.6 or less. ¨

6. Florida Past - A Matter of Public Confidence

William J. Bigler, PhD

Throughout the long history of the State Board of Health (1889-1969), the Annual Reports focus on the accomplishments of the agency Executive Officer, or State Health Officer, and his key staff. The president of the board, as a rule , usually penned a rather bland "letter of transmittal" to forward the report to the Governor. But the Legislature of 1909 stirred things up a bit. That year they diverted $60,000 of the Board’s budget to "relieve a financial stringency in another department of State government." Thus, a "long anticipated… plan to establish a sanitarium for the indigent tuberculous citizens of Florida had to be deferred." In February 1910, when E. M. Henry as President of the Board sent the 1909 Annual Report to Albert W. Gilchrist, he reminded the Governor just how important public health was to the development and well being of Florida. Some choice excerpts from his letter follow:

…It is not my purpose to more than direct your attention to certain features of this report which to me are particularly interesting from a business man’s point of view and which seem to bear especially upon the State-wide influence which the Board has induced during the past twenty-years and from which great good has resulted to the people both educationally and practically.

It is a well known fact that prior to the great epidemic of yellow fever in 1888 the increase in the State’s population from immigration was almost inappreciable compared with the gain since the period mentioned. It is within the memory of even our younger people that as each summer came there was talk of yellow fever, its probability of occurrence and the point where it would first make its appearance. This periodic agitation of a subject which vitally interested not only the physical life of the citizen, but his business existence as well, brought about conditions which yearly disturbed home comfort and retarded the coming of people into the state, besides restricting investment capital, so necessary to develop many important industries and avenues of commerce which held our flattering returns. People were scary, and naturally so in placing their money where health conditions were so uncertain and where an epidemic of yellow fever depressed values to a degree that it would take years of exemption to recover from…

Compare the condition existing in the State in 1888 with an epidemic of yellow fever in Jacksonville, and the conditions which prevailed in 1905 with an epidemic of the same disease in Pensacola, Fla. In the former instance panic prevailed; every man’s hand was raised against his neighbor of adjoining counties, under a false supposition of protection against an unseen enemy; commerce was strangled and stagnation of business followed. In 1905 – in the latter instance – without a ten-mile area around Pensacola, travel within the State was undisturbed. Business followed its usual methods and there was no panic, no excitement, no hysteria of even those most skeptical of the ability of the State Board of Health to cope with the situation and confine the disease to one point in the State…

These facts are mentioned to you, not in a boastful way, but to emphasize the growth of confidence on the part of the people in an institution which the people themselves in their wisdom had provided for in the Constitutional Convention of 1885…

Is it unreasonable, therefore, to argue or to maintain that the part played in the wonderful development of Florida since 1888 has not been due very largely to a confidence in the safety of living in the State, which…has been inspired by the work which the State Board of Health has done along health lines and… is still earnestly engaged in?…I do not say or pretend to assert that the State Board of Health has been the only factor in the strides which Florida has made towards financial development in the past twenty years, but I do maintain without fear of successful contradiction, that the Board has contributed a large share to the success which the State now enjoys, and it will be recognized in the future, if not already so considered, as an investment on the part of the people which should be allowed the greatest latitude of administration.

Editorial Note: Even today the Department of Health (DOH) and County Health Departments (CHD’s) continue to maintain the confidence of the public, both visitors and residents alike, when outbreaks of infectious disease threaten the state. It takes an enormous amount of effort and resources to respond to and contain outbreaks even if they are localized. Now, with increasing opportunities for travel, it is not unusual to have cases from a point source outbreak quickly spread throughout the world. The control of multi-county foodborne outbreaks by products from other states and countries also continues to present interesting challenges.

Still, perhaps the most dramatic statewide outbreaks we have had to deal with in recent years have been caused by the mosquito-borne St. Louis Encephalitis (SLE) virus. This is one agent that can still cause public panic for several months as well as impact the state’s economy. Fortunately, we have a well conceived multi-agency plan for the surveillance and control of SLE and great deal of experience in providing the public with timely and credible information during an outbreak. We hope to continue to maintain public confidence as we prepare for bioterrorism attacks, an influenza pandemic and outbreaks of other emerging infectious diseases. ¨

7. Weekly Disease Table: Week 36

County-Confirmed Cases, Sorted Alphabetically by Disease

(NR represents years that the disease lacked status as a reportable condition)

DISEASE

1996 TO DATE

1997 TO DATE

1998 TO DATE

3 YEAR AVERAGE

TO DATE

1998 TOTAL CASES

1999 TO DATE

Amebiasis

54

39

46

46.3

91

34

Anthrax

0

0

0

0

0

0

Botulism

0

0

0

0

0

0

Brucellosis

5

0

2

2.3

3

1

Campylobacteriosis

797

685

514

665.3

975

628

Ciguatera

8

6

7

7

7

2

Cryptosporidiosis

138

81

97

105.3

203

91

Cyclosporiasis

180

64

6

83.3

6

5

Dengue

0

3

2

1.7

5

2

Diphtheria

0

0

0

0

0

0

E. coli O157:H7

23

38

28

29.7

57

38

E. coli, other (known serotype)

3

5

3

3.7

12

12

Ehrlichiosis, Human

4

2

0

2

1

2

Encephalitis, Eastern Equine

0

2

0

0.7

0

0

Encephalitis, St. Louis

0

0

0

0

2

0

Encephalitis, other (known organism)

5

8

3

5.3

7

3

Encephalitis, post-infectious1

13

6

8

9

21

5

Giardiasis (acute)

1210

1017

905

1044

1636

724

Haemophilus influenzae, invasive1

15

17

30

20.7

45

32

Hansen’s Disease (Leprosy)

1

0

3

1.3

4

2

Hantavirus Infection

0

0

0

0

0

0

Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome

0

3

8

3.7

12

6

Hemorrhagic Fever

0

0

0

0

0

0

Hepatitis A

304

332

340

325.3

539

451

Hepatitis B

347

259

272

292.7

466

285

Hepatitis C2

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

39

Hepatitis Non-A, Non-B

58

60

63

60.3

95

5

Hepatitis, perinatal B2

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

1

Hepatitis, unspecified

3

5

11

6.3

26

11

Hepatitis, +HBsAg, pregnant woman2

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

15

Lead Poisoning

1324

949

1217

1163.3

1805

474

Legionellosis

26

18

24

22.7

48

17

Leptospirosis

0

0

1

0.3

2

0

Listeriosis2

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

18

Lyme Disease

13

22

27

20.7

71

28

Malaria

57

55

41

51

96

59

Measles

1

3

2

2

2

2

Meningococcal Disease (N. meningitidis)

137

111

95

114.3

133

81

Meningitis, Group B Streptococci

19

11

11

13.7

22

11

Meningitis, Haemophilus influenzae1

5

6

11

7.3

12

11

Meningitis, Streptococcus pneumoniae

76

55

61

64

96

74

Meningitis, Listeria monocytogenes

4

2

4

3.3

13

5

Meningitis, other bacterial (including unspecified)

76

40

41

52.3

75

45

Mercury Poisoning

5

2

0

2.3

4

2

Mumps

6

8

10

8

11

3

Neurotoxic Shellfish Poisoning2

3

0

0

1

0

0

Pertussis

68

51

33

50.7

39

60

Pesticide Poisoning

1

0

1

0.7

1

1

Plague

0

0

0

0

0

0

Poliomyelitis

0

0

0

0

0

0

Psittacosis

0

0

1

0.3

2

0

Rabies, Animal

162

200

146

169.3

215

135

Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever

1

2

1

1.3

2

2

Rubella, including congenital

10

2

3

5

4

0

Salmonellosis

1472

1280

1531

1427.7

3038

1580

Shigellosis

975

859

1437

1090.3

2343

934

Smallpox2

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

0

Staphlococcus aureus, (GISA/VISA)2

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

0

Staphlococcus aureus, (GRSA/VRSA)2

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

0

Streptococcal Disease, invasive Group A

2

25

32

19.7

57

56

Streptococcus pneumoniae, invasive disease

7

138

304

149.7

493

427

Tetanus

1

1

2

1.3

3

2

Toxic Shock Syndrome

0

1

4

1.7

4

4

Toxoplasmosis

6

4

7

5.7

15

10

Typhoid Fever

19

8

11

12.7

16

22

Vibrio cholerae (serogrp O1)

0

0

0

0

0

1

Vibrio cholerae (serogrp Non-O1)

2

6

6

4.7

11

8

Vibrio vulnificus

7

11

19

12.3

35

12

Vibrio other (including unspecified)

16

21

53

30

73

30

Yellow Fever

0

0

0

0

0

0

1 Haemophilus influenzae can be the agent responsible for disease under three of the reportable conditions listed-: "Haemophilus influenzae, invasive" and under "Encephalitis, post infectious." Cases of Haemophilus influenzae meningitis are reported under "Meningitis, H. influenzae."

2 The reportable disease rule was revised in July, 1999. Kawasaki Disease, Histoplasmosis, Reye Syndrome, and Typhus were deleted from the weekly disease table since cases are no longer reportable as of July 4, 1999. Hepatitis C; perinatal hepatitis B; hepatitis B +HbsAg, pregnant woman; listeriosis; smallpox, S. aureus (GISA/VISA) and S. aureus (GRSA/VRSA) were added to the reporting requirements as of July 4, 1999. Paralytic shellfish poisoning is now referred to as neurotoxic shellfish poisoning.

This page was last modified on: 10/26/2012 09:13:39