|
 EPI UPDATE
A weekly publication by the Bureau of Epidemiology
For September 13, 2000
"The reason for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information on a disease is to control that disease. Collection and analysis should not be allowed to consume resources if action does not follow."
--Foege WH et al. Int. J of Epidemiology 1976; 5:29-37.
Richard S. Hopkins, MD, MSPH, Bureau Chief, State Epidemiologist
Don Ward, Surveillance Section Administrator, Epi Update Managing Editor
Jill H. Parker, MSP, Epi Update Editor
Bureau of Epidemiology Frequent Contributors:
|
Steven Wiersma, MD, MPH,
Deputy State Epidemiologist |
William J. Bigler, PhD, MS,
Senior Epidemiologist |
Jodi Baldy, MPH,
Biological Scientist IV |
|
Ursula E. Bauer, PhD,
Chronic Disease Epidemiologist |
Lisa Conti, DVM, MPH,
State Public Health Veterinarian |
Regional Epidemiologists:
|
Dolly Katz, PhD, MPH,
SE Florida |
Roger Sanderson, RN, MA,
SW Florida |
Carina Blackmore, MS Vet. Med., PhD,
NE Florida Carina Blackmore, MS Vet. Med., PhD, |
Zuber Mulla, MSPH,
Central Florida Carina Blackmore, MS Vet. Med., PhD, |
Please print out this material and share with epidemiology staff, county health department directors, administrators, medical directors, nursing directors, environmental health directors and others with an interest in information of this type. Thank you.
The Bureau of Epidemiology is available 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week for consultation at our main number (850/245-4401) PLEASE NOTE:
Consultation after 5 p.m. & on weekends is intended for emergencies.
In this issue:
1. ASES 2000 Registration Deadline is September 27,2000
2. Deep Infection Following a Body Piercing Event
3. Descriptive Epidemiology of Suicide in Volusia County
4. Factors Facilitating Dispersal of West Nile Virus
5. CDC Hospital Infections Program (HIP) Begins New Endeavor to Monitor Antimicrobial Use and Resistance
6. Weekly Disease Table: Week 36
1. ASES 2000 Registration Deadline is September 27,2000
Don’t forget to register for the Annual Statewide Epidemiology Seminar (ASES)
which will be held October 5-6 in Clearwater, Florida. The meeting will provide
current information and education to public health professionals regarding the
reporting, investigation, and control of communicable and non-infectious
diseases of public health significance, with the focus of improving the health
of Florida residents and visitors. The primary audience is county health
department epidemiologists and other related staff. Private physicians,
practitioners, professionals in infection control, state and private laboratory
staff, etc. are also welcome. Students enrolled in a public health program are
also encouraged to participate in the annual seminar.
2. Deep Infection Following A Body Piercing Event
Bill L. Toth, MPH, Orange County Health Department
On August 31, 2000 the epidemiology section of the Orange County Health Department received a call from a news producer at WFTV, Channel 9. The producer called to follow-up on a body piercing complaint received from a viewer. The reporter alleged a young Orlando woman sustained a serious infection following a nipple piercing procedure. The TV station claimed to have known of the incident for three weeks and that the woman had to have part of her breast excised to the point of possibly restricting her ability to breast feed her future children. The news channel wanted to use the story to heighten public awareness of the dangers of body piercing, to follow up on the Department of Health’s progress in regulating piercing salons and, moreover, to seek advice for the public to follow when visiting salons. The request for an interview was welcomed. Epidemiology staff followed-up with the affected individual (name released by the station). A summary of the information obtained is as follows.
Interview with the twenty-one year old female regarding body-piercing incident revealed that she visited a local Orlando salon during "…spring break" (last week in March 2000). She arrived at the salon with a friend about 4:30 PM where she requested services for a bilateral nipple piercing. She claimed to have received no explanation of the procedure from the operator; he "…just got everything ready." She did not observe the operator using gloves while selecting the nipple rings from a drawer. The rings were not wrapped in a packet, but were put into a disinfecting solution. She claimed the area to be pierced was cleansed with "… alcohol, or peroxide or something." The cleansing agent was used with "… the kind of towel I used after treating from the doctor [4X4 sponge]." She reported that the operator did use gloves for cleaning the rest of the procedure, but it is not known whether the gloves were sterile.
When the woman was asked if the operator used the same piercing needle for both nipples, she said that after the breast was clamped, she shut her eyes until the procedure was complete. She said the areas pierced hurt for a day or two, but were not painful or exhibiting erythema. When asked about after-care instruction, she said that she threw the instruction sheets away, however, she claimed to have cleaned the wounds and turned the rings two to three times a day. When asked if the rings were made of copper, gold, steel or some other metal, she claimed they looked like stainless steel.
She noticed a sensation in both nipples describing that it "…almost hurt, but not really hurting." She noticed flu-like symptoms beginning about June 1st. She claimed to have experienced a low grade fever for about two weeks [100.5ºF] prior to noticing a more serious pain and redness in and around her right nipple on June 18th. On June 21st she noticed a discharge from the nipple and sought medical care on June 23rd.
On June 23rd, she was examined by an Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner at a walk-in clinic. Observing red streaks on the breast, the ARNP diagnosed her with cellulitis. The ARNP instructed the woman to remove the rings, gave her an injectable antibiotic and an antibacterial cream. The left nipple improved, but the right did not.
On July 4th, the woman returned to the clinic and a physician examined her. The right nipple and breast was red, swollen, painful and inverted. The doctor marked the red area with a pen, gave her a prescription for Augmentin and told her to return the following day. Her body temperature was 102-102.5ºF. Her mother, a nurse, also suggested she apply a warm moist soak. On July 10th the woman was examined by another physician who diagnosed her with a large, deep abscess that required surgical debridement. The woman agreed to the procedure and surgery was immediately scheduled. At about 4:00 o’clock the following morning the abscess opened and "…one half to a cup of fluid drained out." The wound was cleaned later the same day and a sample of the fluid was taken for culture: the culture was negative for bacteria (likely due to antibiotic treatment). She claimed that the odor of the discharge was horrible and "…the grossest stuff I’ve ever seen."
This was the third piercing experienced by the woman. The first was a piercing above the navel in 1997; the second was another piercing, just below the navel in 1998. She also claimed that the owner/operator of the salon was not present at the nipple piercing and that the individual who performed the piercing was not the usual operator.
Current rules allow the public to report complaints of infection or other situations in body piercing salons, however the public may not be aware of the rule or method to report (see editorial note for reporting procedure information). Special voluntary reporting of incidents similar to this will be requested from walk-in clinics and emergency departments in Orange County.
Although the woman is of the opinion that the infection was the fault of the salon or operator, the span of time between the salon visit and onset of signs and symptoms is suggestive of individual failure in after-care follow up. The question of needle reuse on one individual may not account for the source of infection; health department nursing observation of piercing techniques suggests that the operators typically use relatively large bore needles. Removal of the needle allows for the wound to immediately close and disallows the jewelry to be inserted. The operator usually inserts the ring end into the bore and withdraws the needle while guiding the jewelry through the wound. In this case, the operator used two needles, one for each side or, in fact reused the needle. The individual did not provide eyewitness for the event due to her nervousness (she kept her eyes shut). Her personal description of the infection and ensuing discharge may be suggestive of a staphylococcal infection deep in the mammary ducts. To determine actual source of infection at this time may not be feasible.
Editorial Note (submitted by Bureau of Facility Programs, Division of Environmental Health):
Body piercing salons are now required to obtain an annual Department of Health license through their county health department. The licensure requirement is part of Florida Statute 381.0075, which went into effect on October 1, 1999.
The Department of Health has provided body-piercing salons with copies of the law stating the new licensing requirement. The new law requires the following:
- training in infection control procedures must be documented prior to the issuance of a license;
- salons must provide customers with instructions for after-care;
- salons must sterilize all instruments and jewelry directly used in piercing procedures;
- salons must sanitize all equipment indirectly used in piercing procedure;
- notarized parental or legal guardian consent is required for minors under the age of 18, with minors under the age of 16 requiring the accompaniment of a parent or legal guardian;
- salons must provide information on the mechanism for filing a complaint (complaints may be filed directly with the body piercing salon or the county health department in which the salon operates) and
- salons must have annual health department inspections completed.
For additional information, please contact Edith Coulter, Division of
Environmental Health, Bureau of Facility Programs.
3. Descriptive Epidemiology of Suicide in Volusia County
Zuber D. Mulla, MSPH, Bureau of Epidemiology, and Bonnie Sorensen, MD, MBA, Director, Volusia County Health Department
Central Florida newspapers have recently reported that the suicide rate in Volusia County is higher than expected [1, 2]. They have described this perceived cluster of suicides as "staggering" and an "epidemic." A suicide prevention and education conference has been planned for October 16, 2000, in Daytona Beach [3].
The Volusia County Health Department (CHD) and the Florida Bureau of Epidemiology have initiated a review of suicide data. Preliminary results are shown below. The annual number of suicides and age-adjusted annual suicide rates were obtained from the Florida Department of Health’s Public Health Indicators Data System (PHIDS) (rates were adjusted to the year 2000 standard million). PHIDS can be accessed on the Internet. Age-group specific rates were obtained from the WONDER Website (Mortality hyperlink) of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Tests of statistical significance were performed using the Epi Info software package.
According to the PHIDS Website, 2068 Floridians committed suicide in 1999, and 80 were residents of Volusia County (Table 1). The frequency of suicides in Volusia County remained stable between 1996 and 1999.
Table 1. Suicide Deaths, Volusia County and Florida, 1989-1999
|
Year |
Volusia County |
Florida |
|
1989 |
68 |
2083 |
|
1990 |
76 |
2073 |
|
1991 |
69 |
2086 |
|
1992 |
64 |
2015 |
|
1993 |
74 |
2107 |
|
1994 |
82 |
2062 |
|
1995 |
101 |
2139 |
|
1996 |
82 |
2144 |
|
1997 |
79 |
2097 |
|
1998 |
80 |
2156 |
|
1999 |
80 |
2068 |
The figure below shows temporal trends in age-adjusted suicide rates. Volusia County’s rates were consistently higher than the State’s rates between 1989 and 1998. The rates in Volusia County decreased between 1995 and 1998.

Our initial examination of age-group specific rates focused on white males because the Chief Medical Examiner of Volusia County indicated in a newspaper article that most of the Volusia County suicide victims in 1999 were white (79/80) and male (68/80) [1].
Table 2 shows suicide rates and relative risks for White males in Volusia County and Florida stratified by age during the period 1993-1997. (Data for 1998 and 1999 were not available at the WONDER Website). Among White males 20 to 24 years of age, Volusia County residents were 67% more likely to commit suicide than Florida residents. This result is statistically significant; that is, this result is not likely due to random chance.
Table 2. Age-Group Specific Suicide Rates (per 100,000), White Males,
Volusia County and Florida, 1993-1997
|
Age-group (years) |
Volusia County rate |
Florida rate |
Relative Risk (Volusia Co. compared to Florida) |
c
2 p-value |
|
20-24 |
47.6 |
28.6 |
1.67 |
0.01 |
|
25-34 |
31.1 |
28.9 |
1.08 |
0.67 |
|
35-44 |
50.1 |
33.3 |
1.50 |
0.001 |
|
45-54 |
49.8 |
34.8 |
1.43 |
0.01 |
|
55-64 |
25.1 |
32.0 |
0.78 |
0.26 |
|
65-74 |
40.3 |
31.0 |
1.30 |
0.08 |
|
75-84 |
69.7 |
52.0 |
1.34 |
0.053 |
There may be discrepancies in the number of suicides among Volusia County residents recorded in the Volusia County’s medical examiner’s database and the CDC’s database (Personal communication, Thomas R. Beaver, MD, Chief Medical Examiner, Volusia County, 08/21/00). This apparent gap will have to be investigated further.
Volusia CHD and the Bureau of Epidemiology will continue to examine the suicide rates in other race-sex groups, and if high-risk groups are identified, a case-control study of risk factors may be designed.
References
- Gibbons, Timothy J. Suicides’ toll staggering: Volusia rate nearly double national average. The News-Journal, February 11, 2000, pages 1A and 15A.
- Bryant, Purvette A. Suicides are up in Volusia: Why? Summit seeks answer to question. The Orlando Sentinel, July 30, 2000, pages K-1 and K-12.
- Conference agenda. Suicide Prevention Coalition of Volusia and Flagler Counties.
4. Factors Facilitating Dispersal of West Nile Virus
(The article below is an excerpt from The 1999 Introduction of the West Nile Virus to North America by Drs. Jonathan Day and Walter Tabachnick, which is posted to the Florida Medical Entomology Library (FMEL)
website.)
Factors that may facilitate dispersal of WN [West Nile virus] include the movement of infected humans, infected vectors (ticks and mosquitoes), and infected amplification hosts (domestic birds, wild resident birds, and wild migratory birds). It is not difficult to envision ways in which this virus may quickly move around the country. Many cities have large populations of vector mosquitoes capable of transmitting this virus. These include Cx. pipiens in the northern half of the country, its close relative Cx. quinquefasciatus in the south, Cx. tarsalis in the west, and Cx. nigripalpus in the deep south. These species of mosquitoes are certainly among the most likely North American candidates to transmit WN to birds and humans. There are likely many other mosquito and tick species that could play a role in keeping WN circulating within a region. If WN is introduced into another region of the USA, it will, in time be observed in domestic avian populations. Nation-wide vigilance for WN is essential.
What Can be Done?
An important question concerning WN movement and transmission throughout North America is: ¨What can be done to monitor the movement and introduction of WN in new cities and localities throughout North America?¨ The answer is simple: surveillance, surveillance, surveillance, and more surveillance. Vector surveillance, amplification host surveillance, meteorological surveillance, and virus surveillance.
Mosquito and vector control programs throughout the USA already have considerable experience monitoring WN's close relative, SLE (see the page on SLE). St. Louis encephalitis has been a continuing problem particularly in the upper mid west, Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and California where there have been many severe outbreaks. A comprehensive integrated arboviral surveillance program for SLE in Florida has been proposed and implemented (see Day and Lewis 1992). Programs similar to this should be considered for areas that are at risk for arboviral transmission, especially WN, SLE, and dengue viruses. The dengue viruses present another potential problem for humans, especially in the southern USA.
It is only through vigilant surveillance that epidemics can be recognized before local, state, and federal health officials are blind-sided by the unexpected appearance of large numbers of infected humans in places like NYC. Accurate risk assessment of a vector borne epidemic will give all public health authorities time to institute control strategies and public awareness campaigns that will reduce the impact of an epidemic.
A second important question is: ¨What can be done to minimize the impact of WN, or other vector borne pathogens, when they do become established in a region.¨ It is essential that the most efficient and effective control or risk management strategies be applied. Authorities will make their decisions about what strategies to use based on scientific information about the pathogen and vectors involved, and local or regional environmental conditions. It is generally accepted that it would be enormously costly and very difficult to vaccinate large human populations to prevent a vector borne epidemic, even were vaccines for these viruses available. Vaccines are not currently available for the vast majority of arthropod-borne pathogens including WN and SLE.
Personal protection against biting arthropods, particularly when they are infected with dangerous pathogens, remains one of the most important ways to avoid disease. Avoid mosquitoes. Make sure screens are in good repair to prevent mosquitoes from entering houses. If you must enter areas where there is a threat of encountering infected mosquitoes, wear protective clothing. Finally, use a personal insect repellent that provides a reasonable Complete Protection Time (CPT). The CPT is the total time following repellent application that the treated individual will remain bite free. For example, under normal conditions the CPT for a 5% formulation of DEET (diethyl toluamide, presently the most effective insect repellent) is approximately 2 hours. The CPT for a 24% DEET formulation is more than 4 hours.
Fortunately, the USA has some of the best mosquito and arthropod control programs in the world. Vector control and personal protection against vectors and the diseases they carry are the best way to avoid infection with vector-borne pathogens. For example, strategies that might be effective against WN in NYC include: the source reduction of mosquito breeding sites; focal applications of insecticides directed against adult and immature mosquitoes; public service announcements to educated residents about the vector, the disease, and disease avoidance; tips to help prevent home-invasion by infected vectors; and information about the most effective means of personal protection. Recent SLE epidemics and outbreaks in Florida have proved that one of the most effective means of reducing human infection is to widely disseminate accurate information through the media in an effort to educate the public. An individual's first line of defense during a vector-borne disease emergency is knowledge and personal protection.
5. CDC Hospital Infections Program (HIP) Begins New Endeavor to Monitor Antimicrobial Use and Resistance
(The following information was excerpted from FOCUS, volume 10, number 3, July – August 2000, published by the CDC/NCID)
The CDC Hospital Infections Program (HIP) has begun the Antimicrobial Use and Resistance (AUR) component project to monitor antimicrobial use and resistance in hospitals that participate in HIP’s National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance System (NNIS). Participating hospitals provide data on antimicrobial use and resistance on a monthly basis. The AUR component provides a national estimate of the prevalence of select antimicrobial-resistant organisms isolated from hospitalized patients, details the amounts of antimicrobial agents used in these hospitals, and allows for interhospital comparison of select antimicrobial use and resistance prevalence. NNIS hospitals can use these data to help monitor use and resistance, as well as for quality improvement projects.
For additional information regarding the AUR component of NNIS, call
404-639-6101 or e-mail Rachel Lawton.
Editor’s Note:
Fifteen of the 320 hospitals that participate in the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance System (NNIS) are in Florida.
6. Weekly Disease Table: Week 36
County-Confirmed Cases, Sorted Alphabetically by Disease
(NR represents years that the disease lacked status as a reportable condition)
|
DISEASE |
1997 TO DATE |
1998 TO DATE |
1999 TO DATE |
3 YEAR AVERAGE
TO DATE |
1999 TOTAL CASES |
2000 TO DATE |
|
Anthrax |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Botulism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
|
Brucellosis |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
2 |
|
Campylobacteriosis |
685 |
514 |
630 |
609.7 |
988 |
658 |
|
Ciguatera |
6 |
7 |
2 |
5 |
2 |
11 |
|
Cryptosporidiosis |
81 |
97 |
92 |
90 |
180 |
71 |
|
Cyclosporiasis |
65 |
6 |
3 |
24.7 |
5 |
7 |
|
Dengue |
3 |
2 |
2 |
2.3 |
3 |
2 |
|
Diphtheria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
E. coli O157:H7 |
38 |
28 |
38 |
34.7 |
55 |
61 |
|
E. coli , other (known serotype) |
5 |
3 |
13 |
7 |
15 |
8 |
|
Ehrlichiosis, Human |
2 |
0 |
2 |
1.3 |
2 |
4 |
|
Encephalitis, Eastern Equine |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
|
Encephalitis, St. Louis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
|
Encephalitis, post-infectious1 |
8 |
3 |
3 |
4.7 |
5 |
4 |
|
Encephalitis, other (known organism) |
6 |
8 |
5 |
6.3 |
14 |
6 |
|
Giardiasis (acute) |
1017 |
905 |
727 |
883 |
1322 |
874 |
|
Haemophilus influenzae , invasive1 |
17 |
30 |
35 |
27.3 |
53 |
37 |
|
Hansen’s Disease (Leprosy) |
0 |
3 |
2 |
1.7 |
3 |
3 |
|
Hantavirus Infection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome |
3 |
8 |
6 |
5.7 |
7 |
8 |
|
Hemorrhagic Fever |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Hepatitis A |
332 |
339 |
445 |
372 |
796 |
333 |
|
Hepatitis B |
259 |
272 |
271 |
267.3 |
528 |
307 |
|
Hepatitis C |
NR |
NR |
37 |
NR |
55 |
35 |
|
Hepatitis Non-A, Non-B |
60 |
62 |
3 |
41.7 |
10 |
8 |
|
Hepatitis, perinatal B |
NR |
NR |
1 |
NR |
|
2 |
|
Hepatitis, unspecified |
5 |
12 |
10 |
1 |
17 |
8 |
|
Hepatitis, +HBsAg, pregnant woman |
NR |
NR |
198 |
NR |
448 |
269 |
|
Lead Poisoning |
949 |
1217 |
1137 |
1101 |
1810 |
592 |
|
Legionellosis |
18 |
24 |
15 |
19 |
27 |
34 |
|
Leptospirosis |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0.3 |
1 |
2 |
|
Listeriosis |
NR |
NR |
19 |
NR |
37 |
20 |
|
Lyme Disease |
22 |
27 |
23 |
24 |
51 |
29 |
|
Malaria |
55 |
41 |
59 |
51.7 |
97 |
56 |
|
Measles |
3 |
2 |
2 |
2.3 |
2 |
1 |
|
Meningococcal Disease (N. meningitidis) |
111 |
95 |
81 |
95.7 |
122 |
84 |
|
Meningitis, Group B Streptococci |
11 |
11 |
11 |
11 |
14 |
14 |
|
Meningitis, Haemophilus influenzae1 |
6 |
11 |
11 |
9.3 |
13 |
4 |
|
Meningitis, Streptococcus pneumoniae |
55 |
61 |
74 |
63.3 |
97 |
65 |
|
Meningitis, Listeria monocytogenes |
2 |
4 |
6 |
4 |
14 |
4 |
|
Meningitis, other bacterial (including unspecified) |
40 |
41 |
40 |
40.3 |
62 |
64 |
|
Mercury Poisoning |
2 |
0 |
2 |
1.3 |
7 |
7 |
|
Mumps |
8 |
10 |
3 |
7 |
6 |
2 |
|
Neurotoxic Shellfish Poisoning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Pertussis |
51 |
33 |
61 |
48.3 |
85 |
41 |
|
Plague |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Poliomyelitis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Psittacosis |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0.3 |
0 |
0 |
|
Q Fever2 |
NR |
NR |
NR |
NR |
0 |
0 |
|
Rabies, Animal |
200 |
146 |
132 |
159.3 |
186 |
116 |
|
Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever |
2 |
1 |
2 |
1.7 |
2 |
4 |
|
Rubella, including congenital |
2 |
3 |
0 |
1.7 |
1 |
3 |
|
Salmonellosis |
1280 |
1531 |
1582 |
1464.3 |
3071 |
1577 |
|
Shigellosis |
859 |
1437 |
935 |
1077 |
1491 |
874 |
|
Smallpox |
NR |
NR |
0 |
NR |
0 |
0 |
|
Staphylococcus aureus, (GISA/VISA) |
NR |
NR |
0 |
NR |
0 |
0 |
|
Staphylococcus aureus, (GRSA/VRSA) |
NR |
NR |
0 |
NR |
0 |
0 |
|
Streptococcal Disease, invasive Group A |
25 |
32 |
46 |
34.3 |
94 |
95 |
|
Streptococcus pneumoniae , invasive disease, drug resistant |
138 |
304 |
386 |
276 |
701 |
704 |
|
Tetanus |
1 |
2 |
2 |
1.7 |
3 |
0 |
|
Toxoplasmosis |
4 |
7 |
10 |
7 |
17 |
7 |
|
Typhoid Fever |
8 |
11 |
22 |
13.7 |
23 |
8 |
|
Vibrio cholerae (serogrp O1) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Vibrio cholerae (serogrp Non-O1) |
6 |
6 |
9 |
7 |
10 |
4 |
|
Vibrio vulnificus |
11 |
19 |
14 |
14.7 |
23 |
3 |
|
Vibrio other (including unspecified) |
21 |
53 |
28 |
34 |
48 |
26 |
|
Yellow Fever |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 Haemophilus influenzae can be the agent responsible for disease under three of the reportable conditions listed-: "Haemophilus influenzae, invasive" and under "Encephalitis, post infectious." Cases of Haemophilus influenzae meningitis are reported under "Meningitis, H. influenzae."
2 The reportable disease rule was revised in June 2000. Amebiasis and Toxic Shock Syndrome (Staphylococcal and Streptococcal) were deleted from the list of reportable diseases. Q Fever was added to the list of reportable diseases.
|